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PLAYING GAMES WITH THE FIRST AMENDMENT: ARE
VIDEO GAMES SPEECH AND MAY MINORS' ACCESS
TO GRAPHICALLY VIOLENT VIDEO GAMES BE
RESTRICTED?
Gregory K Laughlin *
I. INTRODUCTION
On March 21, 2005, a sixteen-year-old boy in Bemdji, Minne-
sota shot and killed his grandfather, his grandfather's compan-
ion, a school guard, a teacher, and five of his classmates at Red
Lake High School.1 Seven others were wounded before Jeff Weise
shot and killed himself, ending yet another of a string of school
killings that has horrified our nation over the past decade.2 The
Associated Press listed the Red Lake High School tragedy as the
fourteenth fatal school shooting since 1997.' News reports de-
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University; J.D., 1986, University of Missouri, Columbus; M.S. in L.I.S., 1995, University
of Illinois, Urbane-Champagne.
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thank Professor James McGoldnick for his review and helpful comments.
1. Joshua Freed, Utter Disbelief, DESERET MORNING NEWS (Salt Lake City), Mar. 23,
2005, at Al, available at 2005 WLNR 4527273.
2. Amy Forliti, Dark Picture Emerges of School Shooter: Teen Drew Gruesome Pic-
tures, Apparently Wrote on Neo-Nazi Site, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Mar. 23, 2005, at 1A,
available at 2005 WLNR 4532074.
3. See Previous Fatal School Shootings, FOXNEWS.COM, Mar. 22, 2005, http://www.
foxnews.com/story/0,2933,151119,00.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2005). The Associated
Press listed the following previous shootings since 1997:
- Sept. 24, 2003: Two students-Aaron Rollins, 17, and Seth Bartell, 14-were fatally
shot at Rocori High School... in Cold Spring, Minn. Fellow student John Jason McLaugh-
lin, who was fifteen at the time of the shooting, awaits trial in the case.
- March 5, 2001: Charles "Andy" Williams, 15, killed two fellow students and wounded 13
others at Santana High School . . . in Santee, Calif., in San Diego County. Williams was
sentenced to fifty-years-to-life in prison.
- May 26, 2000: Thirteen-year-old honor student Nathaniel Brazill ... killed his English
teacher, Barry Grunow, on last day of classes in Lake Worth, Fla. after the teacher refused
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scribed a young man obsessed with violence. The Associated
Press reported: "He created comic books with ghastly drawings of
people shooting each other and wrote stories about zombies. He
dressed in black, wore eyeliner and apparently admired Hitler
and called himself the 'Angel of Death' in German."4 Once again,
as with each previous school shooting, grieving parents and a
shocked nation asked why.' Many have pointed fingers at violent
to let him talk with two girls in his classroom. He was convicted of second-degree murder
and is serving a twenty-eight-year sentence.
- Feb. 29, 2000: Six-year-old boy shot and killed six-year-old classmate at Buell Elemen-
tary School in Mount Morris Township, Mich. Because of his age, the boy was not charged.
- Nov. 19, 1999: Thirteen-year-old girl shot in the head in school at Deming, N.M., and
died the next day. A twelve-year-old boy later pleaded guilty and was sentenced to at least
two years in juvenile prison.
- Apr. 20, 1999: Students Eric Harris, 18, and Dylan Klebold, 17, killed twelve students
and a teacher and wounded twenty-three before killing themselves at Columbine High
School... in Littleton, Colo.
- May 21, 1998: Two teenagers were killed and more than twenty people hurt when a
teenage boy opened fire at a high school in Springfield, Ore., after killing his parents. Kip
Kinkel, 17, was sentenced to nearly 112 years in prison.
- May 19, 1998: Three days before his graduation, Jacob Davis, an eighteen-year-old
honor student, opened fire at a high school in Fayetteville, Tenn., killing a classmate who
was dating his ex-girlfriend. Davis was later sentenced to life in prison.
- April 24, 1998: Andrew Wurst, 15, opened fire at an eighth-grade dance in Edinboro,
Pa., killing a science teacher. The boy pleaded guilty to third-degree murder and other
charges and is serving thirty to sixty years in prison.
- March 24, 1998: Two boys, 11 and 13, fired on their Jonesboro, Ark., middle school from
nearby woods, killing four girls and a teacher and wounding ten others. Both boys were
later convicted of murder and can be held until age twenty-one.
- Dec. 1, 1997: Three students were killed and five wounded at Heath High School in
West Paducah, Ky. Michael Carneal, fourteen-year-old, later pleaded guilty but mentally
ill to murder and is serving life in prison.
- Oct. 1, 1997: Sixteen-year-old Luke Woodham of Pearl, Miss., fatally shot two students
to death and wounded seven others after stabbing his mother to death. He was sentenced
the following year to three life sentences plus 140 years.
- Feb. 19, 1997: A sixteen-year-old boy took a shotgun and a bag of shells to school in Be-
thel, Alaska, and killed the principal and a student and injured two others. Evan Ramsey
is serving a 210-year sentence. Id.
4. Forliti, supra note 2.
5. This represents a recurring theme throughout American history. Youth violence is
nothing new. While the percentage and number of students was much smaller in the sev-
enteenth century, teachers in that era went to extraordinary means to keep order, includ-
ing tying children to whipping posts and beating them, branding, and even putting them
to death. See David Greenberg, Students Have Always Been Violent, SLATE, May 7, 1999,
http://slate.msn.com/id/27715 (last visited Nov. 13, 2005). Greenberg reported:
Branding fell from favor in the 18th century, but students were still
flogged or tied to chairs .... In the early 19th century, school reformer Horace
Mann reported that he saw 328 floggings in one school during the course of a
week ....
... In 1837, Mann noted that almost 400 schools across Massachusetts
had to be shut down because of disciplinary problems. In most institutions,
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media, including video games,6 which they argue are desensitiz-
ing those who play them, and perhaps even encouraging acts of
violence.7 In response to these concerns, some states and localities
keeping order took precedence over teaching. One observer in 1851 likened
the typical American school to "the despotic government of a military camp."
In the colleges, where the teen-age students were bigger and less docile, vio-
lence was even worse. Princeton University, to take just one example, wit-
nessed six major riots between 1800 and 1830, including the burning of the
library in 1802 and a rash of campus explosions in 1823 that caused half of
one class to be expelled.
School violence persisted into the 20th century, taking different forms ac-
cording to the climate of the day. In politically charged times, students be-
came violent in the name of political causes. In 1917, for example, when New
York City introduced a "platoon" system to deal with an influx of pupils, stu-
dents rebelled-literally. Between 1,000 and 3,000 schoolchildren picketed
and stoned P.S. 171 on Madison Avenue and attacked nonstriking class-
mates. Similar riots erupted across the city, resulting in furious battles be-
tween student mobs and the police. Likewise, the civil rights movement and
anti-Vietnam War protests brought different forms of "political" violence to
places ranging from Little Rock Central High in Arkansas to Kent State Uni-
versity in Ohio.
Id.
6. At the time of this writing, it is not yet clear whether Jeff Weise played violent
video games, though it seems likely. His aunt, Kim Desjarlait, stated that he loved to play
video games, but the type of games was not mentioned. David Hanners & Beth Silvers,
Troubling Internet Postings Clash with Family's View of a Happy Weise, ST. PAUL PIONEER
PRESS, Mar. 24, 2005, at 1A, available at 2005 WLNR 4598253. School officials also indi-
cated that Weise was "big into video games." Don Erler, Label These Games "W' for Wrong,
STAR-TELEGRAM.COM, Mar. 29, 2005, http://www.dfw.com/mld/dfw/news/opinion/1125
6 7 2 8.
htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2005). Some reports indicate that shortly before the shootings,
Weise viewed Elephant, a 2003 movie about a fictional school shooting by two boys, one of
whom plays violent video games. See Red Lake Shootings: Deputy Put on Leave; Publica-
tion of His E-mail about Shooting Preceded Action, GRAND FORKS HERALD, Apr. 1, 2005,
available at 2005 WLNR 5078012.
Violent crimes committed by suspects alleged to have been avid players of violent video
games include the school shootings in Paducah, Kentucky in December 1997; Jonesboro,
Arkansas in March 1998; Springfield, Oregon in May 1998; Columbine High School in
Littleton, Colorado in April 1999; Santee, California in March 2001; Wellsboro, Pennsyl-
vania in June 2003; and Red Lion, Pennsylvania in April 2003. In addition, other violent
crimes linked to players of violent video games include a crime spree in Oakland, Califor-
nia in January 2003; five homicides in Long Prairie and Minneapolis, Minnesota in May
2003; beating deaths in Medina, Ohio and Wyoming, Michigan in November 2002; and the
"Beltway" sniper shootings in Washington, D.C. in the fall of 2002. Video game related
crimes have also been reported in Germany and Japan. See Craig A. Anderson, An Update
on the Effects of Playing Violent Video Games, 27 J. OF ADOLESCENCE 113, 113 (2004).
7. Blaming media for the misbehavior of youth also has a secure place in American
history. In 1872, Anthony Comstock helped found the Committee for the Suppression of
Vice. He lobbied Congress for passage of what has become known as the Comstock Act,
arguing that "children could purchase 'vile books' at their schools for a mere ten cents."
Margaret A. Blanchard, The American Urge to Censor: Freedom of Expression Versus the
Desire to Sanitize Society-From Anthony Comstock to 2 Live Crew, 33 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 741, 747 (1992). C.L. Merriam, a member of the House of Representatives from New
York, argued that passage of the Comstock Act was necessary because "our fair Republic
will be of but short duration unless the vigor and purity of our youth be preserved.'" Id. at
2006]
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748 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 3d Sess. app. 168 (1873)). In addition to targeting
material on sexuality, contraception, and abortion, Comstock opposed publication by news-
papers of stories about football and boxing (as too violent), 'so-called blood and thunder
publications that carried vivid stories of crime," and dime novels. Id. at 757. He termed
the latter "'devil-traps for the young,"' id. (citing Mary Noel, Dime Novels, AM. HERITAGE,
Feb. 1956, at 55), which he argued "were leading youths down the path to destruction, for
once a child had read such stories, no one could prevent a career of crime and loss of an
immortal soul." Id. In 1881, the Boston Public Library was the subject of controversy be-
cause it collected "'many directly immoral books,'" which it made available to minors.
Gregory K. Laughlin, Sex, Lies, and Library Cards: The First Amendment Implications of
the Use of Software Filters to Control Access to Internet Pornography in Public Libraries,
51 DRAKE L. REV. 213, 223 (2003) (citing EVELYN GELLER, FORBIDDEN BOOKS IN AMERICAN
PUBLIC LIBRARIES, 1876-1939: A STUDY IN CULTURAL CHANGE 32-34 (1984)). After a
heated public debate, the library board, which initially had opposed any restrictions on
access, bowed to public pressure and "removed the offending books from its shelves, cre-
ated separate cards for young users (along with separate fiction and juvenile collections),
and provided the librarian and his staff more power to "'suppress[] all works discovered to
be vicious.'" Id. at 224. With the advent of motion pictures, proponents of the argument
that media corrupted youth had a new target. Even before the turn of the twentieth cen-
tury, in the infancy of motion pictures, the sexual content of movies was the subject of
complaints. See Blanchard, supra, at 761. By 1903, complaints of crime and violence were
also being raised with the release of The Great Train Robbery. Id. By 1907, the first ordi-
nance censoring motion pictures was enacted. Id. In 1911, Pennsylvania enacted the first
statewide law censoring movies. Id. at 762. Congress considered, but failed to pass, legis-
lation which would have created a national board to censor movies. Id. at 764. Corruption
of youth was, naturally, a ready defense for such regimens. See id. at 763. At the same
time that motion pictures were being attacked as harmful to minors, ragtime music was
under a similar assault. In 1899, the newspaper Music Courier declared:
A wave of vulgar, filthy and suggestive music has inundated the land.
Nothing but ragtime prevails, and the cake-walk with its obscene posturing,
its lewd gestures. . . [sic] Our children, our young men and women are con-
tinually exposed to its contiguity, to the monotonous attrition of this vulgariz-
ing music. It is artistically and morally depressing and should be suppressed
by press and pulpit.
Shasta College, Controversies Associated with Music and Its Lyrics, http://www3.shasta
college.edu/music/hrj/apndxe.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2005). The 1920s saw concerns
about the impact of jazz on youth. One critic of jazz wrote:
Welfare workers tell us that never in the history of our land have there been
such immoral conditions among our young people, and in the surveys made
by many organizations regarding these conditions, the blame is laid on jazz
music and its evil influence on the young people of to-day.
Anne Shaw Faulkner, Does Jazz Put the Sin in Syncopation, LADIES' HOME J., Aug. 1921,
at 16. Also in the 1920s, a new media emerged-broadcast radio. By the 1930s and 1940s,
radio was blamed for contributing to juvenile delinquency by inspiring criminal acts and
providing instructions on methods. See Ellen A. Wartella & Nancy Jennings, Children and
Computers-New Technology-Old Concerns, THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN, (Fall/Winter
2000), at 31, 33, available at http://www.futureofchildren.orglusrdoc/vollOno2Art2.pdf
(last visited Nov. 13, 2005). In 1938, swing music was declared to be "'a degenerated musi-
cal system ... turned loose to gnaw away the moral fiber of young people." Shasta Col-
lege, supra (quoting Francis J.L. Beckman, Archbishop of Dubuque). In the early and mid
1950s, local governments and states began enacting laws regulating comic books. See An-
gela J. Campbell, Self-Regulation and the Media, 51 FED. COMM. L.J. 711, 749 (1999). In
1954, the United States Senate held hearings into the alleged relationship between juve-
nile delinquency and the reading of comics. See Blanchard, supra, at 789. Frederick Wer-
tham, a New York psychiatrist, purported to find such a connection. See id. at 788-89. At
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have enacted restrictions on the sale or access to certain video
games.' Congress has considered, but has yet to enact, national
regulation of violent and sexually explicit video games.9
Three cases arising out of such government-imposed restric-
tions (an ordinance enacted in Indianapolis and Marion County,
Indiana,' ° another enacted in St. Louis County, Missouri,1' and a
statute enacted in Washington state12) presented the questions
which this article seeks to address: (1) are video games speech
and, as such, entitled to protection under the First Amendment;
and (2) if so, may minors' access to graphically violent games
nonetheless be restricted? The Seventh Circuit, in American
Amusement Machine Association v. Kendrick,3 determined that
at least some such games are speech, and minors' access to
graphically violent games may not be restricted, at least where
they had not "used actors and simulated real death and mutila-
the same time, concerns were being raised about the new medium of television, including
allegations that it contributed to juvenile delinquency. Congress held hearings on these
alleged effects as early as 1955. See Wartella & Jennings, supra, at 34. In the early 1990s,
a public furor erupted over the publication of trading cards featuring criminals, including
notorious serial killers and mass murders. Several states and localities considered, and in
some cases enacted, restrictions on the distribution of these cards to minors. See Gail
Johnston, Note, It's All in the Cards: Serial Killers, Trading Cards, and the First Amend-
ment, 39 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 549, 549 (1994).
8. Among the jurisdictions which have enacted such regulations are Indianapolis,
Indiana, St. Louis County, Missouri, and Washington State. See infra notes 10-12 and ac-
companying text. Other jurisdictions which have considered or are considering such re-
strictions include California, the District of Columbia, Georgia, Illinois, Maryland, Minne-
sota, and North Carolina. See 3 Int'l Game Developers Ass'n, Anti-Censorship-Lobbying,
http://www.igda.org/censorship/lobbying.php (last visited Nov. 13, 2005).
9. See Protect Children from Video Game Sex and Violence Act of 2003, H.R. 669,
108th Cong. (2003). The Protect Children from Video Game Sex and Violence Act would
have penalized the sale and the attempt to sell at retail and rental outlets to minors "any
video game that depicts nudity, sexual conduct, or other content harmful to minors." Id.
Content harmful to minors was defined as:
video game content that predominantly appeals to minors' morbid interest in
violence or minors' prurient interest in sex, is patently offensive to prevailing
standards in the adult community as a whole with respect to what is suitable
material for minors, and lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value for minors, and contains-
(A) graphic violence;
(B) sexual violence; or
(C) strong sexual content.
Id.
10. Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2001).
11. Interactive Digital Software Ass'n v. St. Louis County, 329 F.3d 954 (8th Cir.
2003).
12. Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Maleng, 325 F. Supp. 2d 1180 (W.D. Wash. 2004).
13. 244 F.3d 572.
20061
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tion convincingly."14 On the other hand, in Interactive Digital
Software Association v. St. Louis County, 5 a federal district court
judge in St. Louis found that video games are not speech, 16 and,
even if they were, minors' access to graphically violent games
may be restricted. 7 The Eighth Circuit reversed both holdings. 8
In Video Software Dealers Association v. Maleng, 9 a federal dis-
trict court in Washington state followed the Seventh and Eighth
Circuit precedents.2"
Professor Kevin W. Saunders has explored and addressed the
specific First Amendment issues involved in the regulation of
youth access to violent video games.2 He has specifically explored
the issue of whether video games are speech and argues that they
are not.22 His conclusion is based on the argument that video
games are non-communicative. As will be more fully developed
below, I must disagree with that conclusion.24 It is not necessary
to conclude that all video games are speech in order to conclude
that video games are being used as a medium through which ex-
pression is communicated. For this reason, any restrictions on
minors' access to violent video games will require First Amend-
ment scrutiny.
Professor Saunders further argues that the First Amendment
permits restricting minors' access to graphically violent video
games even if they are speech.25 Here, his arguments are on a
much sounder footing. While similar arguments were rejected in
Kendrick, Interactive Digital Software, and Video Software Deal-
ers, the Supreme Court has yet to consider this issue. When and
14. Id. at 579. The court of appeals did not directly address whether video games are
speech, but implicitly accepted the conclusion of the district court that at least some games
were speech. This implicit acceptance of the holding of the district court is evidenced by
the court of appeals' holding that the restrictions at issue violated the First Amendment.
If video games are not speech, then the court would have no basis for such a holding.
15. 200 F. Supp. 2d 1126 (E.D. Mo. 2002), rev'd, 329 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2003).
16. Id. at 1135.
17. See id.
18. See 329 F.3d at 956.
19. 325 F. Supp. 2d 1180.
20. See id. at 1184-85.
21. See generally Kevin W. Saunders, Regulating Youth Access to Violent Video
Games: Three Responses to First Amendment Concerns, 2003 MICH. ST. L. REV. 51.
22. See id. at 93-105.
23. See id. at 105.
24. See infra text accompanying notes 213-37.
25. See Saunders, supra note 21, at 106-07, 109.
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if it does, the Court should uphold restrictions on minors' access
to such games. Such restrictions fall within the reasoning which
the Court has already held justifies restricting minors' access to
sexually explicit material that is not obscene as to adults.26 The
lower courts that have considered similar restrictions on graphi-
cally violent video games have too narrowly applied the reasoning
of the Court, restricting its applicability more than the opinions
in those cases warrant.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF VIDEO GAMES AND THE CONTROVERSY
OVER VIDEO GAME VIOLENCE
A. The Development of Video Games
Video games27 were first conceived in 1949 by Ralph Baer, then
a young engineer employed by Loral.2" His assignment was to de-
sign a home television set. Baer suggested that the company
should "include some novel features, like adding some form of TV
game."29 The idea was rejected.3" Three years later, in 1952, A.S.
Douglas, working on his Ph.D. at the University of Cambridge in
the area of Human-Computer interaction, created a tic-tac-toe
game, which is considered the first graphical computer game.31 In
1958, William Higinbotham created Tennis for Two, which was
played on the oscilloscope at Brookhaven National Laboratory.32
In 1962, Stephen Russell of MIT created what many acknowledge
as the first computer video game, Spacewar.33 The game was es-
sentially a crude (by today's standards) two-player game involv-
26. See id. at 87-88.
27. The author uses the term video games to encompass the entire genre of games
whether played on a dedicated device, such as an arcade machine or a hand-held gaming
computer, or on a computer or video monitor (such as a television) which may be used for
purposes other than playing games.
28. See Ralph Baer, How Video Games Invaded the Home TV Set, R.H. BAER




31. Mary Bellis, Computer and Video Game History, ABOUT.COM, http://inventors.
about.com/library/inventors/blcomputer videogames.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2005).
32. See The First Video Game, BROOKHAVEN NAT'L LAB., http://www.bnl.gov/bnlweb/
history/higinbotham.asp (last visited Nov. 13, 2005).
33. See Spacewar, GAMES OF FAME, http://www3.sympatico.ca/maury/games/space/
spacewar.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2005).
2006]
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ing a battle between two spaceships firing photon torpedoes.34
Within a few years, Spacewar had spread to nearly every re-
search computer in America.35
Meanwhile, seventeen years after he had first conceived of the
video game and while Chief Engineer and Manager of the
Equipment Design Division at Sanders Associates, Ralph Baer
revisited the idea of using television to play games. On September
1, 1966, he drew up a handwritten outline of his thoughts, includ-
ing some possible categories of games. These categories included
action games, board skill games, artistic games, instructional
games, board chance games, card games, game monitoring, and
sports games.36 On October 20, 1966, Baer and a colleague played
a "Chase Game."37 With a team of others, Baer continued to de-
velop the concept, eventually reaching an agreement with Mag-
navox, who turned his design into the first Odyssey (ILT-200)
game in 1972. Magnavox demonstrated Odyssey to its dealers and
the press in March 1972."s
Present at one of these demonstrations was Nolan Bushnell.
Stephen Russell, the creator of Spacewar, had introduced Bush-
nell to computer games while Bushnell was an engineering stu-
dent at Stanford University.39 The Odyssey demonstration in-
spired Bushnell to create PONG.40 PONG was the first successful
arcade game.41 The game was essentially a video form of table
tennis.42 That same year, Bushnell and Ted Dabney started Atari
34. See id.; see also Mary Bellis, Spacewar: The First Computer Game, ABOUT.COM,
http://inventors.about.com/library/weekly/aa090198.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2005).
35. Bellis, supra note 34.
36. Ralph Baer, Notes Page, R.H. BAER CONSULTANTS, http://www.ralphbaer.com/
Notes-page.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2005).
37. Baer, supra note 28.
38. Id.
39. Bellis, supra note 34.
40. See id.
41. Action, GAME RESEARCH, http://www.game-research.com/action.asp (last visited
Nov. 13, 2005).
42. Id. In his book Zap! The Rise and Fall of Atari, Scott Cohen describes the intro-
duction of Pong:
One of the regulars approached the Pong game inquisitively and studied
the ball bouncing silently around the screen as if in a vacuum. A friend joined
him. The instructions said: "Avoid missing ball for high score." One of [them]
inserted a quarter. There was a beep. The game had begun. They watched
dumbfoundedly [sic] as the ball appeared alternately on one side of the screen
and then disappeared on the other. Each time it did the score changed. The
score was tied at 3-3 when one player tried the knob controlling the paddle at
[Vol. 40:481
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Computers.43 Three years later, Atari released PONG as a home
video game.44 With the commercialization of video games by
Atari, the industry was born. Fifty-seven video games were intro-
duced to the market in the years 1974 and 1975."5 The next year
saw that number nearly double.46 Yet, it was not until 1980 that
any video game was registered with the Copyright Office. In that
year, Atari registered two of its games, Asteroids47 and Lunar
Lander.4' That same year, Midway acquired a license to market
Pacman. Since Pacman and games similar to it are what were
considered by courts in early cases holding that video games were
not speech, 49 a brief explanation of it may be useful:
[Pilayers find themselves guiding "puckman" around a single
maze eating dots, while avoiding the four ghosts "blinky," "pinky,"
"inky" and "clyde" (each with varying levels of hunting skills), who
escape from a cage in the middle of the screen and will end our little
yellow friend's life if they touch him. [Iln each corner of the square
playfield is a large dot that when eaten will turn the ghosts blue for
a brief period, during which time the tables turn and "puck" can eat
the ghosts, leaving only the apparently indigestible eyes which make
their way back to the cage for reincarnation into another ghost.
[D]uring every screen a treat appears for the player under the ghost-
cage, in the form of fruit or a bell or some other symbol waiting to be
devoured.5°
his end of the screen. The score was 5-4, his favor, when his paddle made
contact with the ball. There was a beautifully resonant "pong" sound, and the
ball bounced back to the other side of the screen. 6-4. At 8-4 the second
player figured out how to use his paddle. They had their first brief volley just
before the score was 11-5 and the game was over.
Seven quarters later they were having extended volleys, and the constant
pong noise was attracting the curiosity of others at the bar. Before closing,
everybody in the bar had played the game. The next day people were lined up
outside Andy Capp's at 10 a.m. to play Pong. Around ten o'clock that night,
the game suddenly died.
SCOTT COHEN, ZAP! THE RISE AND FALL OF ATARI 29 (1984) (quoted in A Brief History of
Home Video Games, GEEKCOMIX.COM, http://www.geekcomix.com/vgh/first/atpongarc.
shtml (last visited Nov. 13, 2005).
43. Bellis, supra note 31.
44. Id.
45. William Hunter, The History of Video Games from 'Pong' to 'Pac-man" DESIGN-
BOOM, http://www.designboom.com/eng/education/pong2.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2005).
46. See id.
47. ASTEROIDS (Atari, Inc. 1980).
48. Hunter, supra note 45; LUNAR LANDER (Atari, Inc. 1980).
49. See Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 115 F. Supp. 2d 943, 951 (S.D. Ind.
2000).
50. Hunter, supra note 45.
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B. A Short History of the Controversy
While Pacman and other games of its generation are the source
of most early case law addressing restrictions on video games,
Death Race51 was responsible for the first popular protest against
violent video games. The game, introduced in 1976, was based on
a movie, Death Race 2000.52 The object of the game was to run
over pedestrians with a car with points awarded for each pedes-
trian killed. If the player failed to kill a given pedestrian on the
first attempt, he or she could put the car in reverse and try again.
Each kill was represented by a cross that appeared where the pe-
destrian had been killed, and a hit was accompanied by an
"ahhhk" sound. The pedestrians were called gremlins, but looked
like stick men. The game's violence became a national issue, with
newspaper stories and a 60 Minutes piece on the psychology of
video game players. As a result of the controversy, the game's
publisher pulled it off the market.53
Another early game that generated controversy was Custer's
Revenge.54 In Custer's Revenge, published in 1983, the player con-
trolled a poorly rendered cartoon version of General George Arm-
strong Custer, who was obviously sexually aroused. The object of
the game was to avoid enemy arrows being shot at Custer while
the player attempted to cause the character to reach a Native
American woman tied to a pole. If Custer made it past the ar-
rows, he would have sexual intercourse (presumably rape, though
the publisher denied this) with the Native American woman tied
to the pole. The game generated protest from women's organiza-
tions, including the National Organization of Women and Women
Against Pornography, and Native American organizations, in-
cluding American Indian Community House.5 While the game
51. DEATH RACE (Exidy 1976).
52. DEATH RACE 2000 (Santa Fe Productions 1976).
53. Lauren Gonzalez, When Two Tribes Go to War: A History of Video Game Contro-
versy, GAMESPOT, http://www.gamespot.com/features/6090892/p-2.html (last visited Nov.
13, 2005). While no reported cases involving the game Death Race were reported, the
movie on which it was based, Death Race 2000, was implicated in a criminal case in Wash-
ington state in which a drunken teenager struck a pedestrian. See State v. Nordby, 723
P.2d 1117 (Wash. 1986). Upon seeing two girls pushing their bicycles, a female passenger
in the car allegedly said, "There's two points!" Id. at 1118. Another passenger then
grabbed and jerked the steering wheel, causing the car to hit one of the two girls.
54. CUSTER'S REVENGE (Mystique 1983).
55. Gonzalez, supra note 53.
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generated considerable protest, it was a commercial failure and
its publisher ultimately went out of business. 6
While controversy regarding violent content has been a part of
the video game industry since the mid-1970s, the rash of school
shootings beginning in the 1990S, the evolution of more realistic
graphics, and the perceptions of ever-increasing depictions of vio-
lence led to efforts to restrict minors' access to the most violent of
these games.57 In particular, the 1999 Columbine High School
shootings brought renewed and more intense attention to the
possible connection between violence in youth and video games.
58
The youths who committed the murders at Columbine, Dylan
Klebold and Eric Harris, purportedly played violent video games,
including Doom.5 9 Indeed, it was reported that Harris had modi-
fied Doom so that the player was invincible and possessed unlim-
ited weaponry and ammunition so that "'[tihe player simply mows
down all the other characters. '"'6
Columbine was not the first school shooting incident with re-
ported ties to video games. In 1997, Evan Ramsey, a high school
student in Bethel, Alaska, shot four students, killing two of
them.61 Ramsey reportedly played Doom, Die Hard Trilogy, 2 and
Resident Evil,63 three violent video games, for hours at a time.
64
That same year, Michael Carneal, who played such violent video
games as Doom Quake65 and Redneck Rampage,66 shot eight stu-
56. See id.
57. Saunders, supra note 21, at 52-61; see also Thomas A. Kooijmans, Effects of Video
Games on Aggressive Thoughts and Behaviors During Development, http://www.person
alityresearch.org/papers/kooijmans.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2005) (reporting more than
a dozen incidences of violence, most resulting in death, tied to video games between 1997
and 2003).
58. Saunders, supra note 21, at 52. Saunders reported that even before the killings at
Columbine High School, approximately two hundred children had been killed in "school
associated violence'" between 1992 and 1998. Id.
59. Id. (citing Burt Hubbard, Researchers Say Harris Reconfigured Video Game: Boy
Turned 'Doom' into School Massacre, Investigators Claim, DENVER ROCKY MOUNTAIN
NEWS, May 3, 1999, at 4A); DOOM (id Software, Inc. 1994).
60. Saunders, supra note 21, at 52-53 (citing Hubbard, supra note 59, at 4A).
61. See Saunders, supra note 21, at 53 (citing Tom Bell & Rosemary Shinohara, Stu-
dent Kills 2 in Bethel: Frightened Teens Flee High School, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Feb.
20, 1997, at Al).
62. DIE HARD TRILOGY (Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. 1997).
63. RESIDENT EVIL (Capcom 1996).
64. Saunders, supra note 21, at 53.
65. QUAKE (id Software, Inc. 1996).
66. REDNECK RAMPAGE (Xatrix Entertainment 1997).
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dents in Paducah, Kentucky, killing three.67 The following spring,
Mitchell Johnson and Andrew Golden, shot fourteen of their fel-
low students and one teacher in Jonesboro, Arkansas, killing four
girls and the teacher. Again, the shooters played violent video
games.6" In 2000, Sean Botkin, a fourteen-year-old who played
GoldenEye 007,69 another violent video game, took hostages at
Glendale Elementary School.7" Subsequent school shootings
linked to minor perpetrators who allegedly played violent video
games include the incidents in Santee, California in March
2001,"' Wellsboro, Pennsylvania in June 2003,72 and Red Lion,
Pennsylvania in April 2003. 73
Following the Columbine shooting, lawmakers began to act. In
July 2000, the City of Indianapolis, Indiana and Marion County,
Indiana enacted an ordinance requiring video arcades with five or
more games to limit the access of minors to games which were
"harmful to minors."74 In October 2000, St. Louis County, Mis-
souri enacted a similar ordinance.75 The state of Washington be-
came the first state to enact such restrictions in 2003.76 As noted
above, several other jurisdictions have or are considering such re-
strictions, and a bill was introduced in Congress which would
have imposed similar restrictions.77
III. ARE VIDEO GAMES SPEECH?
"Legal rules not only prescribe results, but they also create (or
recognize) the categories of conduct to which the rules apply.
67. See Saunders, supra note 21, at 53 (citing Ted Bridis, Praying Students Slain,
LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER, Dec. 2, 1997, at Al).
68. See id. at 54-55.
69. GOLDENEYE 007 (Nintendo of America, Inc. & Rare, Ltd. 1997).
70. The Center for Successful Parenting, The Facts, http://www.sosparents.org/the%20
facts.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2005).
71. See Anderson, supra note 6, at 113.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. See Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 115 F. Supp. 2d 943, 946-47 (S.D.
Ind. 2000), rev'd, 244 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2001).
75. See Interactive Digital Software Ass'n v. St. Louis County, 200 F. Supp. 2d 1126,
1129 (E.D. Mo. 2002).
76. Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Maleng, 325 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1183 (W.D. Wash.
2004).
77. See supra notes 8-9.
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Without categories there could be no rules.""8 "[A] necessary part
of any rule [I is that part that describes the category of facts to
which the rule applies."79
A. What Speech Is Not
Zechariah Chafee is noted for observing: "Everybody seemed to
be for free speech, just as everybody was then for 'freedom of the
seas,' but there was the same semantic vagueness." ° The ques-
tion of where speech ends and action begins is not susceptible to
an easy solution. If one defines speech as any communication of
information, then everything is speech or, at least, a medium of
speech. This is not a new concept. The psalmist understood this
concept some 3000 years ago when he wrote:
The heavens are telling the glory of God; and the firmament pro-
claims his handiwork. Day to day pours forth speech, and night to
night declares knowledge. There is no speech, nor are there words;
their voice is not heard; yet their voice goes out through all the
earth, and their words to the end of the world.8 '
Here, the psalmist proclaims that all of creation communicates
to the world the "glory" and "handiwork" of God. The universe can
be seen, according to the psalmist, as a medium by which God
communicates. It is at once, one may say, the message, the me-
dium, and the intended recipient of God's communication. More
in keeping with the task of this article, the translators of the Re-
vised Standard Version chose the word "speech" twice to repre-
sent the Hebrew word I, which the psalmist used in the quoted
passage to describe this communication.8 2 The psalmist under-
stood the communicative nature of the universe and, in verse 2,
calls this communication "speech" even though, as he wrote in
78. Frederick Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34
VAND. L. REV. 265, 265 (1981).
79. Id. at 265 n.2.
80. Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Thirty-Five Years with Freedom of Speech, reprinted in
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FROM HAMILTON TO THE WARREN COURT 325 (Harold L. Nelson
ed., 1967).
81. Psalm 19:1-4a (Revised Standard Version).
82. Speech was also the word chosen by the translators of the Authorized Version (i.e.,
King James Version), the New Revised Standard Version, the Douay-Rheims Version (who
chose "speeches" for the second use), the New American Standard, and Young's Literal
Translation, among other English translations. The translators of the Septuagint chose
the word rhema to represent the Hebrew word m= in Verse 2 of Psalm 19 and logoi to rep-
resent it in Verse 3.
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Verse 3: "There is no speech, nor are there words; their voice is
not heard." 3
Used in this way, speech means anything which conveys infor-
mation, and, as can be seen by this example from the Psalms,
anything can and everything does convey information. Pottery
shards and ashes from ancient archeological discoveries convey
information to trained archeologists about the people who created
the pottery and used the fire. A bridge conveys information about
its design and construction to an engineer trained in the con-
struction of bridges. A car's engine conveys information about its
design and method of operation to a trained mechanic. DNA con-
veys information to a geneticist about the organism from which it
came and to the cells of the organism itself. One could go on ad
infinitum. It can be seen that while the conveying of information
is a necessary element of "speech," it is too broad a definition to
use in deciding how that term as used in the First Amendment
should be applied, unless one wants to interpret the term so
broadly as to prohibit Congress from enacting any laws at all.84
B. What Speech Is
Obviously, this was not the intent of the Framers of the First
Amendment. Several of the Framers of the First Amendment had
just completed crafting the original Constitution, which largely
dealt with establishing the procedures for which branches of gov-
ernment would have which powers and responsibilities for creat-
ing, executing, and interpreting the laws of the new nation. The
application of the term speech must be limited unless it is to be-
come the exception that swallows the law-making provisions of
the Constitution. What the Framers of the First Amendment in-
tended to protect is largely, if not entirely, lost in the mist of
time.85 They left few clues, and it is likely that they did not think
83. Psalm 19:3 (Revised Standard Version).
84. See STANLEY FISH, THERE'S No SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH 105 (1994).
The distinction [between speech and action] is essential because no one would
think to frame a First Amendment that began "Congress shall make no law
abridging freedom of action," for that would amount to saying "Congress shall
make no law," which would amount to saying "There shall be no law," only
actions uninhibited and unregulated.
Id.
85. Leonard Levy observed that "much of history lies in the interstices of the evidence
and cannot always be mustered and measured." LEONARD W. LEVY, LEGACY OF
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through all the potential implications of what conduct might fall
within the definition of the term speech. Indeed, it is likely that
individual Framers who drafted and approved the final language
of the First Amendment and individual state legislators who
voted to ratify it might have had different concepts of exactly
what conduct fell within the scope of the Free Speech Clause's
protection. While much has been written about what the Framers
may have intended, in the end much, if not all, of the conclusions
drawn are little more than educated speculation. Unless one is
inclined to apply the words in a wooden literal sense and limit the
Free Speech Clause's protection to oral and written communica-
tion," one is forced to turn elsewhere to determine what conduct
falls within the word speech as used in the First Amendment.
Whatever the Framers might have intended, it is the precedent
established by the Supreme Court to which we must turn for
guidance in deciding whether video games are speech.
The Free Speech Clause did not receive a great deal of atten-
tion from the courts from the time of the ratification of the First
Amendment through the first decade and a half of the twentieth
century. Given the importance placed on the adoption of a Bill of
Rights by the anti-federalists, this comes as somewhat of a sur-
prise. This lack of case law may reflect several causes. First, the
First Amendment limited only the federal government, specifi-
cally Congress. 7 It was not until 1925 that the Supreme Court
held that the Fourteenth Amendment made the restrictions of the
First Amendment applicable to state and local governments."8
Thus, for more than 100 years after its ratification, only legisla-
tion passed by Congress could have raised First Amendment
problems. After the Alien and Sedition Act lapsed, Congress
passed no restrictions on speech that attracted sufficient opposi-
SUPPRESSION, at viii (1960). David Anderson, after quoting Levy, added, "[a]scertaining
the intent underlying recent legislation is difficult enough, even with the advantages of
contemporary perspective and records vastly superior to those kept 200 years ago." David
A. Anderson, The Origins of the Free Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. REV. 455, 497 (1983).
86. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 576-77 (1991) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring) ("The First Amendment explicitly protects 'the freedom of speech [and] of the press'
-oral and written speech-not 'expressive conduct. . . . This is not to say that the First
Amendment affords no protection to expressive conduct. Where the government prohibits
conduct precisely because of its communicative attributes, we hold the regulation unconsti-
tutional.").
87. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131,
1157 (1991).
88. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
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tion on First Amendment grounds to create any case law.8 9 A sec-
ond possibility is that the agitation for a Bill of Rights was, as
some argued at the time, a ruse by the anti-federalists to defeat
the Constitution,9  and, having failed in that effort, those who
were the biggest proponents of the First Amendment went on to
other issues. Whatever the cause for this lack of significant case
law development, World War I represents the end of this era and
the opening of intense development of free speech jurisprudence
which continues to this day. It is in the twentieth century that
courts began to seriously grapple with the issue of what the Free
Speech Clause was designed to protect.
The purpose here is not to explore in depth that history, but to
summarize the more important developments relative to the
question of the boundaries of speech. In 1931, in Stromberg v.
California,9 the Supreme Court of the United States for the first
time applied the Free Speech Clause to nonverbal conduct. In
Stromberg, the Court held that a California statute criminalizing
the displaying of a red flag "as a sign, symbol or emblem of oppo-
sition to organized government"92 violated the right of free
speech.93 The Court did not specifically address its reasoning for
applying free speech protection to the conduct of displaying a red
flag. The Court did, however, note that the statutory language at
issue "might... be construed to include peaceful and orderly op-
position to government by legal means."'94 Apparently, without
explicitly stating so, the Court found from the language of the
statute that it was designed to punish conduct used for expressive
purposes and that such non-verbal, expressive conduct was
speech.95 In his dissent, Justice Butler recognized the implicit
finding of the majority, that such conduct was speech, by denying
89. Congress passed legislation during this time that certainly would raise First
Amendment objections today. For example, the Comstock Act enacted in 1873 restricted
dissemination of information about contraceptives and abortion. These restrictions cer-
tainly implicated "speech" no matter how narrowly one might seek to define that term. See
supra note 7.
90. Stanley C. Brubaker, Original Intent and Freedom of Speech and Press, in THE
BILL OF RIGHTS: ORIGINAL MEANING AND CURRENT UNDERSTANDING, 82, 84-85 (Eugene
W. Hickok, Jr., ed., 1991) (citing Madison to Richard Peters, Aug. 19, 1789) (quoted in
LEONARD W. LEvY, EMERGENCE OFA FREE PRESS 261, 266 (1985)).
91. 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
92. Id. at 361 (internal quotations omitted).
93. See id. at 368-69.
94. Id. at 369.
95. See id. at 366-67.
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that the issue of "whether the mere display of a flag as the em-
blem of a purpose [should be considered] speech within the mean-
ing of the constitutional protection" was before the Court.96
In 1940, in Thornhill v. Alabama,97 the Court held that free-
dom of speech encompassed "peaceful picketing.""8 Thornhill has
been recognized as the Court's earliest extension of freedom of
speech "beyond expression of ideas, the right to inform and per-
suade, to disagree, and to protest in political matters."99 Thus,
Thornhill is the Court's earliest holding that the First Amend-
ment protects expressions which "inform about less than public
matters." °° Neither Stromberg nor Thornhill, however, provided
generally applicable principles for determining when conduct
other than the oral or written use of words related to "public mat-
ters" was speech.
It was not until 1974, in Spence v. Washington, °1 that the
Court articulated a test for when activity is speech: the activity
must be undertaken with "[a]n intent to convey a particularized
message ... and in the surrounding circumstances the likelihood
[is] great that the message [will] be understood by those who
view[] it." 0 2 While the test seems straightforward, its application
has proven to be anything but straightforward. In Hurley v. Irish-
American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston,'°' the
Court addressed one weakness of the Spence test, noting that "a
narrow, succinctly articulable message is not a condition of con-
stitutional protection, which if confined to expressions conveying
a 'particularized message,' . . . would never reach the unques-
tionably shielded painting of Jackson Pollock, music of Arnold
Sch6enberg, or Jabberwocky verse of Lewis Carroll.'
0 4
While this holding may have aided the Court in deciding the
case before it in Hurley, it failed to articulate a test for when an
activity not conveying a particularized message would nonethe-
less constitute speech. Further, many activities which are clearly
96. Id. at 376 (Butler, J., dissenting).
97. 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
98. See id. at 105.
99. Louis Henkin, Forward: On Drawing Lines, 82 HARV. L. REV. 63, 78 n.48 (1968).
100. Id.
101. 418 U.S. 405 (1974).
102. Id. at 410-11.
103. 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
104. Id. at 569.
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not speech as that term is used in the First Amendment can
nonetheless satisfy the Spence test. No one can doubt that the
September 11, 2001, hijackers intended "to convey a particular-
ized message, " "' and "the surrounding circumstances" made it all
too clear what that message was. Yet the Court has held that the
First Amendment does not protect violent conduct by which the
violent actor intends to convey a threatening message even when
there exists a sufficient likelihood that the message will be un-
derstood. 10 6
What we are left with are very inexact and not universally ap-
plicable definitions and descriptions of what conduct the Court
will consider speech for purposes of applying First Amendment
protections. As one lower court has noted, determining whether
given conduct is speech involves a "hodgepodge of categories and
tests ... [,] semantic distinctions and artificial rubrics."' ° As the
First Amendment is perhaps our most revered reservation of
rights, this has opened the door for anyone wanting to challenge
government restrictions on his or her chosen conduct. A wide
range of conduct has been the subject of First Amendment analy-
sis. For example, reported cases have addressed whether each of
the following are speech: social dancing,10 8 nude dancing,'0 9 flag
burning,' flag display,"' mandated flag saluting," 2 solicitation
105. The message is at least as particularized as the message conveyed in Spence. See
418 U.S. at 410-11.
106. See, e.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 360 (2003) (demonstrating that states
may ban cross burning with intent to intimidate, and noting the history of the use of cross
burning by the Ku Klux Klan as part of its "reign of terror"); Chaplinsky v. New Hamp-
shire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (explaining that states may punish those words "which by
their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace").
107. Loper v. N.Y. City Police Dep't, 802 F. Supp. 1029, 1041 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), affd, 999
F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1993).
108. City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 24 (1989) (stating that social dancing
"do[es] not involve the sort of expressive association that the First Amendment has been
held to protect").
109. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 566 (1991) ("[N]ude dancing... is ex-
pressive conduct within the outer perimeters of the First Amendment, though we view it
as only marginally so.").
110. United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 317-18 (1990) (holding that flag burning
is a form of expression protected by the First Amendment).
111. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369-70 (1931) (holding that displaying a
red flag "'as a sign, symbol or emblem of opposition to organized government'" is protected
under the First Amendment).
112. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632 (1943) ("[Fllag sa-
lut[ing] is a form of utterance. Symbolism is a primitive but effective way of communicat-
ing ideas" which may not be compelled without violating the First Amendment.).
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by charities,113 panhandling,"4 draft card burning,115 cross burn-
ing,116 mask wearing,"' computer software source code,1 8 and
games.
1 9
C. Application to Video Games
While games like Death Race and Custer's Revenge created the
first protests against video game violence, they were not the sub-
ject of the first cases addressing the issue of whether video games
are speech. Rather, such litigation developed out of efforts to limit
the availability of video games without regard to their content.
Nonetheless, parties in these early cases asserted that the regula-
tions in question violated the First Amendment. In rejecting
these claims, several courts held that the First Amendment was
not implicated because video games were not speech. These cases
113. Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980) (stat-
ing that solicitation by charities is entitled to First Amendment protection).
114. Gresham v. Peterson, 225 F.3d 899, 904 (7th Cir. 2000) (stating that the Court
"assum[ed] for the purposes of ... appeal that some panhandl[ing] [is] speech . . . pro-
tected by the First Amendment.").
115. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968). The Court rejected the proposi-
tion that the First Amendment protected the burning of a draft card, stating that it could
not
accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled
"speech" whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to ex-
press an idea .... [W]hen "speech" and "nonspeech" elements are combined in
the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in
regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First
Amendment freedoms.
Id.
116. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358 (2003) ("The First Amendment affords protec-
tion to symbolic or expressive conduct as well as to actual speech.").
117. Church of the Am. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Kerik, 356 F.3d 197, 208 (2d
Cir. 2004) ("[W]here, as here, a statute banning conduct imposes a burden on the wearing
of an element [a mask] of an expressive uniform [of the Ku Klux Man], which element has
no independent or incremental expressive value, the First Amendment is not
implicated .. ").
118. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 445 (2d Cir. 2001) ("Commu-
nication does not lose constitutional protection as 'speech' simply because it is expressed in
the language of computer code."). But see Junger v. Daley, 8 F. Supp. 2d 708, 717 (N.D.
Ohio 1998) ("[E]xporting source code is conduct that can occasionally have communicative
elements. Nevertheless, merely because conduct is occasionally expressive, does not neces-
sarily extend First Amendment protection to it."), rev'd, 209 F.3d 481, 485 (6th Cir. 2000)
("Because computer source code is an expressive means for the exchange of information
and ideas about computer programming, we hold that it is protected by the First Amend-
ment.").
119. There to Care, Inc. v. Comm'r of Ind. Dept. of Revenue, 19 F.3d 1165, 1167 (7th
Cir. 1994) (explaining that bingo is not "speech" for purposes of the First Amendment).
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form the legal precedents which parties and scholars have cited
in recent years for the proposition that video games are not
speech and are therefore unprotected by the First Amendment.
Indeed, several of these cases were cited by the district court in
Interactive Digital Software to support its holding that video
games were not speech. 120 To understand why these earlier cases
do not support the proposition that the games at issue in the re-
cent cases are not speech it is necessary to explore those earlier
cases, including the video games then at issue and the reasoning
for the holdings.
1. The Early Cases Holding that Video Games Are Not Speech
American Best Family Showplace Corp. v. City of New York 121
was the first reported case to hold that video games are not
speech and thus not entitled to protection under the First
Amendment. 122 At issue were various city zoning and licensing
regulations which "effectively preclude[d]" the plaintiff from op-
erating a restaurant in which it intended to have forty dining ta-
bles in which video games were embedded. 12' The regulations in
question required a license for operating video games and re-
stricted such licensing to no more than four games except in a
zone which permitted arcades. 124 The plaintiffs location was not
in such a zone. 125 The plaintiff argued that the zoning and licens-
ing restrictions violated its First Amendment rights, asserting
that video games were speech. It argued that the 'visual and au-
ral presentations on a screen involv[e] a fantasy experience in
which the player participates.", 26 The plaintiff compared the
games to movies. 27 The court rejected this argument, finding no
element of information or idea was being communicated. 2 The
court declared: "In no sense can it be said that video games are
meant to inform. Rather, a video game, like a pinball game, a
120. 200 F. Supp. 2d 1126, 1133 (E.D. Mo. 2002).
121. 536 F. Supp. 170 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
122. Id. at 174.
123. Id. at 171.
124. Id. at 172.
125. Id.
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game of chess, or a game of baseball, is pure entertainment with
no informational element."129
American Best Family Showplace was soon followed by several
other cases reaching the same conclusion. Among these were
Caswell v. Licensing Commission for Brockton,"3 ° which cited
American Best Family Showplace in finding that video games
were not speech. 31 The Caswell court, however, cited two unpub-
lished opinions which held that video games were speech and, as
a consequence, entitled to First Amendment protection. 8 2 While
acknowledging that "video games might involve the element of
communication," '33 the court held that the plaintiff had "failed to
demonstrate that video games import sufficient communicative,
expressive or informative elements to constitute expression pro-
tected under the First Amendment."'34 Similar reasoning led to
the same conclusion in Malden Amusement Co. v. City of Mal-
den,' Marshfield Family Skateland, Inc. v. Town of Marsh-
field,'36 Kaye v. Planning and Zoning Commission, Westport,
37
and People v. Walker.3 '
Following similar reasoning are cases which denied First
Amendment protection to video games in upholding regulations
designed to limit their access to minors. In Tommy and Tina Inc.
v. Dep't of Consumer Affairs of New York, 3 9 the regulation in
129. Id. at 174. It should be noted that the court cited no authority for the proposition
that pinball games, chess, or baseball were not speech.
130. 444 N.E.2d 922 (Mass. 1983).
131. Id. at 926.
132. Id. (citing Oltmann v. Palos Hills, No. 82 CH 3568, slip op. at 13-14 (Ill. Cir. Ct.,
Aug. 20, 1982) (holding that a "trial judge determined that, since video games are similar
to movies, they deserve First Amendment protection"); Gameways, Inc. v. McGuire, N.Y.
L.J., May 27, 1982, at 6, col. 2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 3, 1982) ("'Considering the fact that
other forms of expression no more 'informative' than video games-viewing nude dancing
through a coin operated mechanism-have been recognized as constitutionally protected
and the elusive line between informing and entertaining, this court concludes video games
are a form of speech protected by the First Amendment."')). The Caswell court also cited
Stern Electronics, Inc. v. Kaufman, 523 F. Supp. 635, 639 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), in which the
court, in a copyright case, compared the game in question to a movie.
133. Caswell, 444 N.E.2d at 926.
134. Id. at 926-27.
135. 582 F. Supp. 297 (D. Mass. 1983).
136. 450 N.E.2d 605 (Mass. 1983).
137. 472 A.2d 809 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1983).
138. 354 N.W.2d 312 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984).
139. 459 N.Y.S.2d 220 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983).
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question limited the access of minors to video games. 140 The regu-
lation prohibited the issuance of a common show license to any
establishment within 200 feet of a school. Its purpose was to pre-
vent truancy.1 41 The regulation, therefore, applied to any video
game without regard to content. The court cited and followed
American Best Family Showplace in finding that the video games
in question imparted no information to the user nor communi-
cated any idea.4
In 1991, the issue of the First Amendment status of video
games was again revisited. In Rothner v. City of Chicago,14 1 the
Seventh Circuit considered whether a city ordinance prohibiting
minors from playing video games during school hours was uncon-
stitutional.1 44 In reviewing the earlier cases, the court stated:
"[T]hese cases do not hold that, under all circumstances, all video
games can be characterized as completely devoid of any [Flirst
[Almendment protection." 45 It then found that the record before
it was insufficient for it to determine whether the games at issue
were protected by the First Amendment. 146 Instead, the court af-
firmed the lower court's holding that "even if the ordinance regu-
lates [F]irst [A]mendment expression, the ordinance is a legiti-
mate time, place, and manner restriction on that expression."147
As noted by Professor Saunders, what makes Rothner particu-
larly interesting and worthy of mention is that Judge Posner, the
author of the opinion in American Amusement Machine, was one
of the judges who decided Rothner.48
2. Recent Case Law Development
In American Amusement Machine, the district court rejected
the holding in earlier cases that video games are not speech. 4 9 At
issue was an Indianapolis ordinance that restricted access of mi-
140. See id. at 226.
141. See id.
142. Id. at 227.
143. 929 F.2d 297 (7th Cir. 1991).
144. See id. at 302-04.
145. Id. at 303.
146. See id.
147. Id.
148. See Saunders, supra note 21, at 96-97.
149. Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 115 F. Supp. 2d 943 (S.D. Ind. 2000).
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nors to violent video games as defined in the act, labeling such
games as "harmful to minors." 5 ° The district court did not declare
that video games were speech per se, but, citing Rothner and lan-
guage in other earlier video game cases, 5' concluded that some
video games conveyed speech. 5 2 The court nonetheless denied a
preliminary injunction against enforcement of the ordinance, con-
cluding that the violence targeted by the ordinance gave suffi-
cient justification for the restrictions imposed.'53 While the court
acknowledged the earlier cases which held that video games were
not speech,5 4 it did not expressly reject them. Instead, it accepted
the plaintiffs' argument that:
the once-predicted future of video games has arrived, that the video
games of the year 2000 have gone far beyond the simple displays [of
the games considered in the 1980s litigation] and that many of to-
day's games are highly interactive versions of movies and story
books, replete with digital art, music, complex plots, and character
development. 155
Examining games presented by the parties, the court found
"that at least some video games contain protected expression."156
In doing so, the court stated: "It is difficult for First Amendment
purposes to find a meaningful distinction between the Gauntlet
game's ability to communicate a story line and that of a movie,
television show, book, or-perhaps the best analogy-a comic
book."5 7 It rejected the argument that the interactive nature of
video games rendered them ineligible to be considered speech.
58
It also noted that video games could be subject to "viewpoint dis-
crimination" and that this added further weight to the conclusion
that they are speech for First Amendment purposes."' Indeed,
the ordinance in question could be so viewed. 160 In Judge Posner's
150. See id. at 946. The ordinance was actually passed by the City-County Council of
the City of Indianapolis and Marion County. Id. For brevity's sake, I will refer to it simply
as being the "Indianapolis ordinance." The text of the Indianapolis ordinance is appended
to the case as Exhibit A. Id. at 981-87.
151. See id. at 950-51.
152. See id. at 954.
153. See id. at 981.
154. See id. at 950-51.
155. Id. at 951-52.
156. Id. at 952.
157. Id.
158. See id.
159. See id. at 953.
160. See id. at 954.
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opinion, reversing the district court's denial of a preliminary in-
junction against enforcement of the ordinance, he accepted with-
out analysis its finding that at least some video games are
speech.161
A more thorough treatment of the issue can be found in the dis-
trict court and appellate court opinions in Interactive Digital
Software.62 The district court began by noting that the First
Amendment protections applied only if the party asserting them
could show that its conduct is expressive. 63 It then set forth the
test for whether conduct qualifies as speech: (1) "an intent to con-
vey a particularized message," and (2) "a great likelihood that
this message will be understood."'" While acknowledging that
"the Supreme Court . . . does not approve of the suggestion that
the constitutional protection ... applies only to the exposition of
ideas," the court nonetheless held that "there must be some ele-
ment of information or some idea being communicated in order to
receive First Amendment protection." 65 Citing the earlier cases
denying that video games were speech'66 and having examined
four games,'67 the district court "found no conveyance of ideas,
expression, or anything else that could possibly amount to
speech." 6 ' The court explicitly rejected the argument "that some
video games do contain expression while others do not."'69 Indeed,
it suggested that such an approach was "dangerous. " 70 Instead,
the district court reasoned that "either a 'medium' provides suffi-
cient elements of communication and expressiveness to fall
within the scope of the First Amendment, or it does not."''
Though unstated, presumably had the district court found that
some video games conveyed a particularized message likely to be
understood, then it would have extended First Amendment pro-
tection to all video games, even to those which did not convey
161. Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 574 (7th Cir. 2001).
162. 329 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2003); 200 F. Supp. 2d 1126 (E.D. Mo. 2002).
163. 200 F. Supp. 2d 1126, 1132 (citing Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468
U.S. 288, 293 n.5 (1984)).
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 1133.
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such a message. Instead, the court found that video games were
closer to board games and sports than to movies.'72 It then cited
cases finding that such games were not entitled to First Amend-
ment protection.'73 It specifically rejected the possibility that "or-
dinary game[s]" are not speech, but the same games become
speech when presented in "video form."'74
Because the Eighth Circuit rejected the lower court's finding on
whether video games are speech, it was required to address that
issue explicitly. It began by rejecting the two part test used by the
district court to determine whether video games are speech.'75 In-
stead, the appellate court, citing Hurley v. Irish-American Gay,
Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston'76 and Winters v. New
York, "'77 found "that a 'particularized message' is not required for
speech to be constitutionally protected." 7 ' Instead, the court
noted Supreme Court precedent holding that "the [F]irst
[A]mendment protects '[e]ntertainment, as well as political and
ideological speech.""79 The court then turned to the record before
it, which included "scripts and story boards showing the storyline,
character development, and dialogue of representative video
games."'' ° Quoting the Supreme Court's opinion in Hurley, the
Eighth Circuit found:
If the first amendment is versatile enough to "shield [the] painting of
Jackson Pollock, music of Arnold Schoenberg, or Jabberwocky verse
of Lewis Carroll,". . . we see no reason why the pictures, graphic de-
sign, concept art, sounds, music, stories, and narrative present in
video games are not entitled to a similar protection."
1
'
While the district court found that the fact that the games con-
tained violence did nothing to establish that they conveyed
speech, the appellate court found these displays of violence to be
172. Id.
173. See id. (citing There to Care, Inc. v. Comm'r of the Indiana Dep't of Revenue, 19
F.3d 1165, 1167 (7th Cir. 1994); Allendale Leasing, Inc. v. Stone, 614 F. Supp. 1440, 1454
(D.R.I. 1985)).
174. Id.
175. See Interactive Digital Software Ass'n v. St. Louis County, 329 F.3d 954, 957 (8th
Cir. 2003).
176. 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
177. 333 U.S. 507 (1948).
178. Interactive Digital Software, 329 F.3d at 957.
179. Id. (quoting Shad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 65 (1981)).
180. Id.
181. Id. (quoting Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569).
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further proof of the games' expressive nature.18 2 While one might
have wished for a more detailed analysis of the question both by
the district court and by the appellate court, the two opinions
provide the first example of two courts examining the same evi-
dence and reaching different conclusions as to whether video
games are speech.
In Video Software Dealers Association, 18 3 the first state statute
restricting minors' access to video games was examined.1 84 The
court devoted only a single paragraph to the issue of whether
video games qualify as speech.18 5 As one might expect when an is-
sue is treated in such brevity, little analysis went into the court's
finding that video games have sufficient expressive elements to
qualify for First Amendment protection. Distinguishing the cases
from the 1980s holding that video games are not speech, the court
stated:
The games at issue in this litigation, however, frequently involve in-
tricate, if obnoxious, story lines, detailed artwork, original scores,
and a complex narrative which evolves as the player makes choices
and gains experience .... In fact, it is the nature and effect of the
message being communicated by these video games which prompted
the state to act in this sphere.
186
In addition to the three cases which have struck down laws re-
stricting minors' access to violent video games, a few courts have
denied tort claims brought by victims of youth violence against
the publisher of violent video games. In these cases, the victims
alleged that the violent video games contributed to the violent
acts committed by minors who played those games. Three cases,
each decided in 2002, rejected such claims on the basis, among
others, that the publishers were protected under the free speech
clause of the First Amendment from liability. In Wilson v. Mid-
way Games, Inc. 187 a mother sued the publisher of the video game
Mortal Kombat,88 claiming that it caused a friend of her son to
stab and kill him.8 9 The court considered the claim of Midway
Games that it was shielded from liability under the First
182. See id. at 957-58.
183. 325 F. Supp. 2d 1180 (W.D. Wash. 2004).
184. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.91.180 (West 2005).
185. See 325 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1184-85 (W.D. Wash. 2004).
186. Id. at 1184.
187. 198 F. Supp. 2d 167 (D. Conn. 2002).
188. MORTAL KOMBAT (Midway Amusement Games, L.L.C. 1999).
189. 198 F. Supp. 2d at 169.
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Amendment. Considering the cases from the 1980s and the more
recent cases, 9 ° the court concluded that:
[Tihe cases are reconcilable on this point: While video games that
are merely digitized pinball machines are not protected speech, those
that are analytically indistinguishable from other protected media,
such as motion pictures or books, which convey information or evoke
emotions by imagery, are protected under the First Amendment ...
[T~he inquiry must be context-specific. Because a pinball machine is
not protected speech, a video game that only simulated a pinball ma-
chine would not be protected speech. Conversely, comic books and
movies are protected speech, so interactive versions of the same
genre are also protected, even though they are labeled "games." In
short, the label "video game" is not talismanic, automatically making
the object to which it is applied either speech or not speech. 191
Applying this standard to Mortal Kombat, the court not only
rejected the argument that the game's interactivity was fatal to
its being classified as speech, it held that this feature actually
served to "enhance everything expressive and artistic about Mor-
tal Kombat: the battles become more realistic, the thrill and ex-
hilaration of fighting is more pronounced."'92 Further, the court
found that plaintiffs complaint further supported the finding that
the Mortal Kombat was speech. The court found that the allega-
tion that the game presented and encouraged violence as "a prob-
lem solving technique" targeted the expressive elements of the
game:
[Ilts plot (i.e., the fact that advancing to different levels of the game
requires increased violence), its characters (all of which are alleged
to be violent), and the visual and auditory milieu in which the story
line is played out (one character's "finishing move" or method of kill-
ing opponents is "tearing off his opponent's head leaving his spinal
cord still dangling"). 193
The second tort case to address the issue of whether video
games were speech was Sanders v. Acclaim Entertainment, Inc.'94
Sanders arose out of the 1999 killings at Columbine High School
and was filed by the widow and children of the teacher killed in
that attack.'95 Among the defendants were publishers of violent
video games played by the killers, Dylan Kiebold and Eric Har-
190. See id. at 179-80.
191. Id. at 181.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. 188 F. Supp. 2d 1264 (D. Colo. 2002).
195. Id. at 1268.
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ris.'96 Unlike the Wilson court, the Sanders court did not try to
distinguish the earlier cases holding that video games are not
speech from the more recent ones.197 Instead, it held that the ear-
lier cases, specifically America's Best, were "directly contrary to
the Supreme Court's teaching that the distinction between infor-
mation and entertainment is so minuscule, that both forms of ex-
pression are entitled to First Amendment protection."'98 Again,
however, the court engaged in little actual analysis of video
games. Indeed, under its holding, one could argue that traditional
games and sports (which are both forms of entertainment) are
likewise protected expression.
The third case, James v. Meow Media, Inc.,"' arose out of the
1997 Paducah, Kentucky school shooting by Michael Carneal. In
finding that the violent video games played by Carneal were
speech, the court noted: "Although the defendants' products may
be a mixture of expressive and inert content, the plaintiffs' theory
of liability isolates the expressive content of the defendants' prod-
ucts." °° It then continued, "Expression, to be constitutionally pro-
tected, need not constitute the reasoned discussion of the public
affairs, but may also be for purposes of entertainment."20 1 It then
declared, "[M]ost federal courts to consider the issue have found
video games to be constitutionally protected."20 2 In doing so, it en-
tirely ignored the earlier cases holding that video games are not
speech. The court then makes a rather remarkable holding:
Extending First Amendment protection to video games certainly
presents some thorny issues. After all, there are features of video
games which are not terribly communicative, such as the manner in
which the player controls the game. The plaintiffs in this case, how-
ever, complain about none of those non-expressive features. Instead,
they argue that the video game, somehow, communicated to Carneal
a disregard for human life and an endorsement of violence that per-
suaded him to commit three murders. Because the plaintiffs seek to
attach tort liability to the communicative aspect of the video games
produced by the defendants, we have little difficulty in holding that
the First Amendment protects video games in the sense uniquely
196. See id. at 1268-70.
197. Compare 198 F. Supp. 2d at 179-82, with 188 F. Supp. 2d at 1279-81.
198. Sanders, 188 F. Supp. 2d at 1279 (citing Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388
(1967)).
199. 300 F.3d 683 (6th Cir. 2002).
200. Id. at 695.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 696.
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relevant to this lawsuit. Our decision here today should not be inter-
preted as a broad holding on the protected status of video games, but
as a recognition of the particular manner in which James seeks to
regulate them through tort liability.
20 3
This statement is remarkable because it appears to indicate
that whether video games are speech depends on the regulation
being reviewed. This is simply illogical. Either such games are
speech or they are not. If they are, then the regulation requires
some level of First Amendment scrutiny. If they are not, no regu-
lation can make them speech. It may be true that "there are fea-
tures of video games which are not terribly communicative," but
this observation applies to other media as well. With any medium
of speech, whether the First Amendment bars a regulation de-
pends on the degree to which expression is restricted and the sig-
nificance of the interest which is used to justify the regulation.
Nothing about video games makes this any different than with
any other medium, other than courts' unfamiliarity with the me-
dium.
While the six most recent cases discussing this issue have
reached the correct conclusion, the courts engaged in very little
analysis in reaching their conclusions. In essence, the opinions
represent very little more than conclusory statements: "video
games are speech because they are communicative and communi-
cative conduct is speech," or "video games are speech because
they are entertainment and entertainment is speech." As Judge
Limbaugh in Interactive Digital Software correctly pointed out,
not all that is entertaining is speech.2 "4 He cited examples such as
bingo and blackjack which have been specifically held not to be
speech.205 Further, not all conduct that communicates information
is speech.20 6 None of the six courts analyzed what made video
games different from unprotected forms of entertainment nor did
they explore what made video games different from other conduct
that communicates information that is not protected. The next
section will discuss several video games which are used to com-
municate a variety of messages. It is because of this capacity and
203. Id.
204. See Interactive Digital Software Ass'n v. St. Louis County, 200 F. Supp. 2d 1126,
1133-35 (E.D. Mo. 2002), rev'd, 329 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2003).
205. Id. at 1134.
206. See supra text accompanying notes 80-84.
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actual use that video games should be considered a medium of
speech and afforded First Amendment protection.
3. Application to More Recent Games
Those who argue that video games are not speech often begin
their argument by citing the cases decided in the early 1980s
which held that the games in question were not speech. They
then apply that reasoning to a subset of currently available video
game titles and argue that more realistic and detailed graphics do
not fundamentally change this analysis. They ignore other games,
however, that have the explicit and primary goal of communicat-
ing a particularized message to the gamers who play them. As
would be expected, the Interactive Digital Software Association
(recently renamed the Entertainment Software Association or
"ESA") disagrees.207 In its "Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs
Motion for Summary Judgment" filed with the district court in
the Interactive Digital Software case, the ESA asserts that "video
games ... are a modern form of artistic expression. Like movies,
today's video games are rich combinations of narrative, storyline,
music, and graphic design. The creative process of developing
video games resembles that of other forms of protected expres-
sion." "' A video game begins as a creative concept in the minds of
game developers and is brought to life by teams of artists. Story
lines and themes guide the development of games from concept
art to a final product that contains extensive plot and character
development. Even games without explicit plots or story lines,
such as puzzle games, contain visual art, graphic design and
sound elements that constitute a form of aesthetic expression
akin to music or abstract art.20 9
Water Cooler Games is a web site dedicated to "videogames
[sic] with an agenda."210 It "explores the emerging field of games
[that] want to do more than simply [be] fun: they want to make a
207. See generally Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judg-
ment, Interactive Digital Software Ass'n v. St. Louis County, 200 F. Supp. 2d 1126 (E.D.
Mo. 2002) (Cause No. 4:00CV2030 SNL), available at http://culturalpolicy.uchicago.
edu/conf200lipapers/markel.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2005).
208. Id. (citations omitted).
209. Id.
210. About, WATER COOLER GAMES, http://www.watercoolergames.org/about.shtml (last
visited Nov. 13, 2005).
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point, share knowledge, change opinions. This includes new gen-
res such as advergaming, newsgaming, political games, simula-
tions and edutainment."21' Among the categories of games listed
on that site are activism games, advergames, business games,
educational games, health and medicine games, newsgames, po-
litical games, public policy games, and social games.212 This sec-
tion examines a few of these and other categories of video games
in an analysis of the competing claims that video games are or
are not speech.
a. Games with Political Messages
A number of games have politics as their theme. Though many
of these games may not convey a particularized political message,
one game that undeniably does so (or at least has the intent to do
so) is Special Force, developed by the Lebanese guerilla group
Hizbollah." 3 Special Force is intended to be "educational for our
future generations and for all freedom lovers of this world of
ours."21 4 In a 2003 article on the game published by Reuters, the
writer stated: "Hizbollah's Internet center created the game, Spe-
cial Force, in commemoration of the battles of the Shi'ite Muslim
group whose attacks helped force Israeli troops out of Leba-
non."215 The game's storyline is described as follows:
First players train at a war college to use guns and grenades by
aiming at pictures of Sharon, as well as Israeli Defense Minister
Shaul Mofaz and former Defense Minister Benyamin Ben-Eliezer.
Players get a medal from Hizbollah leader Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah
after completing their cyber training.
At the next stage, they break through an Israeli position in south
Lebanon and salute pictures of real-life "martyrs" killed at the same
spot. Finally, players fight Israeli troops and blow up helicopters.
When Israelis are killed, they yell "you killed me" in Hebrew.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. See News, SPECIALFORCE, http://www.specialforce.net/english/indexeng.htm (last
visited Nov. 13, 2005).
214. Important Notice, SPECIAL FORCE, http://www.specialforce.net/english/
important.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2005).
215. Mariam Karouny, Hizbollah Computer Game Recalls Israeli Battles, REUTERS,
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Bilal az-Zein, of the Hizbollah Internet center, "said the game
showed the 'integrity of the resistance and fighting the occupa-
tion.'.... 'The goal [of Special Force] is to create an alternative to
similar Western games where Arabs and Muslims are portrayed
as terrorists."'217 One young player stated: "'This game reminds us
of the fighters and their suffering. It also entertains us and sends
the Jews a message of defiance. "',218
This apparently was exactly the particularized message that
the developers of Special Force intended. On the web site where
Hizbollah describes the game, its meaning and intent, and where
it is available for downloading, the genesis of the game is de-
scribed as follows:
In the Name of Allah, Most Gracious, Most Merciful
One time I was walking in Beirut, the capital that "defeated
the greatest army of the world". [sic] I stopped by one of the
computer game shops dispersed widely in Beirut and most
Arab cities. I saw the children playing the game of the invinci-
ble American hero, who's never out of ammunition and con-
tinually wins. I asked one of the children, did you like the
game? He replied yes, but I wish I were playing as an Arab
Moslem fighting the Jews as the Islamic Resistance did in
Lebanon! After that, he left to the alleys of Beirut roaming
with heroes of the Islamic Resistance.
This is where the necessity emerged for a prompt action of
designing the basic construction for the world of the games
that match with reality and illustrate battles executed by
young men who never played an imaginary game; rather they
fought real battles that humiliated the Zionist enemy .... 219
Other games that are explicitly designed to communicate a po-
litical message include the Bushgame game by Starvingeyes,
Inc.22° One of the developers of the game described its intent as
follows:
Bushgame combines humor, opinion, and fact to bring an entertain-
ing and informative video game adventure to people everywhere. The
use of this medium will hopefully reach many people who have not
had the time or interest to read up on some of the appalling things
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Design, SPECIAL FORCE, http://www.specialforce.net/english/design/design.html
(last visited Nov. 13, 2005).
220. Bushgame, EMOGAME.COM, http://www.emogame.com/bushgame.html (last visited
Nov. 13, 2005).
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that have taken place in our government and society over the past
four years.
2 2 1
One feature of the game is that it allows players to jump to "edu-
cational parts," which include "Surplus/Deficit," "Budget Crisis,"
"Estate Tax," "Tax Cuts for the Rich," "Bush and Enron," "Halli-
burton and Tax Shelters," "The Environment," "Jobs and Bene-
fits," "God and Terrorism. "222 While describing the content as of-
ten sophomoric may be too kind, the game's author nonetheless
clearly used the medium of video games to communicate a par-
ticularized message. Part cartoon video, part video game, the po-
litical message intended is not merely understandable, it is un-
mistakable. The Bushgame was one of the video games with a
partisan political message described by the New York Times in an
article published during the 2004 election.223
b. Games with Social Messages
Molleindustria is an Italian company which produces online
video games with political and social themes. 224 On its web site,
Molleindustria states:
We believe that the explosive slogan that spread quickly after the
Anti-WTO demostrations [sic] in Seattle, "Don't hate the media, be-
come the media," applies to this medium. We can free videogames
[sic] from the "dictatorship of entertainment," [sic] using them in-
stead to describe pressing social needs, and to express our feelings or
ideas just as we do in other forms of art. But if we want to express
an alternative to dominant forms of gameplay we must rethink game
genres, styles and languages. The ideology of a game resides in its
rules, in its invisible mechanics, and not only in its narrative
parts.
2 25
Two of Molleindustria games address labor issues. Molleindustria
promotes one of its games, TuboFlex, as follows: "Year 2010. The
need of mobility has grown to excess since the first years of the
millennium. That's why Tuboflex inc., [sic] the world's leading
221. About, BUSHGAME.COM, http://www.bushgame.com/about.html (last visited Nov.
13, 2005).
222. See supra note 220.
223. Michael Erard, In These Games, The Points Are Political, N.Y. TIMES, July 1,
2004, at G1.
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Human Resources Services organisation, created a complex tube
system that make [sic] it possible to dislocate employees in real
time, depending on demand."226 It promotes another of its games,
Tamatipico, as follows: "Tamatipico Is [sic] Your virtual flex-
worker: He works, he rests and he has fun when you want him to!
Raise his productivity but pay attention to his energy and his
happyness [sic] because he could get injured or strike."227
c. Games with Religious Messages
A growing area of the video game industry are games specifi-
cally designed for and marketed to Christians. While some of
these games merely avoid the violent and sexually explicit con-
tent of the games that are the targets of criticism and legislation,
many of these games are promoted as teaching Christian morals,
Bible stories, or church history. For example, Big Idea Produc-
tions, the creator of the popular VeggieTales animated cartoon
series, also produces video games.22 Some of these games lack
explicit moral lessons. Others, however, are marketed as teaching
values. Josh and the Big Wall!,229 is a web-based game based on
the Biblical story of Joshua and the Battle of Jericho and on a
video Big Idea produced under the same name. On a web page ti-
tled "Info for Parents," Big Idea states the following about this
game:
"Josh and the Big Wall!" is our online, playable version of the Veg-
gieTales video! In Josh and the Big Wall!, Bob the Tomato, Larry the
Cucumber and Junior Asparagus teach kids that God's way is better
than our own way of doing things. We hope your kids will take the
game's lesson to heart!
230
On a web page titled "A Note from Phil," Phil Vischer, the foun-
der of Big Idea, states the following about the company's purpose
behind its video games:
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. See Company and Mission: Our Story, BIGIDEA.coM, http://www.bigidea.com/com
pany/ourstory.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2005); Games, BIGIDEA.COM, http://www.bigidea.
corn/games (last visited Nov. 13, 2005).
229. Josh and the Big Wall!, BIGIDEAFuN.coM, http://www.bigideafun.com/veggie-
tales/arcade/josh/info.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2005).
230. VeggieTales: Info for Parents, Josh and the Big Wall!, BIGIDEAFUN.COM, http:ll
www.bigideafun.com/veggietales/arcadejosh/parents-popup.htm (last visited Nov. 13,
2005).
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We've had a ball sharing with you the adventures of Bob the To-
mato, Larry the Cucumber and the rest of the gang! Entertaining
kids is a big endeavor in itself, and at Big Idea we want our stories
to be high-quality entertainment-and to teach timeless values from
the Bible. We want to give parents the tools they need to raise their
kids in a media-saturated world. Now Big Idea Interactive is telling
these kinds of stories in a whole new way! It's one thing for a kid to
sit and watch a video or go to the movies; getting them to interact
with the story and make decisions on the computer screen helps kids
learn these lessons even more.
2 3 1
Nor is Big Idea alone in the effort to teach Christianity through
video games. N'Lightning Software Development produces a
game called Catechumen.32 The publisher's web site promotes the
game's link to church history as follows:
Rome had long been a land of persecution towards the minorities,
particularly that of the Christian minority. Persecution reached its
epitome under the rule of Caesar Nero. The Christians had little
that they could do against the Roman government, but to have faith
in God, and pray. Christian persecution had escalated until Roman
spies would infiltrate the Christian churches, bringing the Roman
authorities with them. Darkness was settling over Christianity, evil
in nature and threatening to destroy the Christian religion only a
few centuries after Christ founded it at the cross. To defend them-
selves, Christians created a recruitment policy that required broth-
ers seeking the Lord to study the Word for a year before undergoing
baptism and partaking in communion. During this time, Christians
in training were known as "Catechumen". [sic]
Not only does the game teach church history, it also teaches gam-
ers about spiritual weapons:
Catechumen is a first person action/adventure Christian game
where your goal is to defeat the forces of evil, descending deeper into
the depths of the Earth and rescue your captured brethren.
Choose from eight powerful spiritual weapons. Each weapon has
its own unique use. Maximize your firepower by learning each
weapon's abilities. Find the lightning sword, the drill sword, the ex-
plosive staff and more.
Encounter Satan's minions and banish them back to their evil
realm. Evil lurks everywhere you turn. With your Sword of the Spirit
in hand, you must confront the demons head on and show them noth-
ing can overcome the power of the Holy Spirit.
231. Phil Vischer, A Note From Phil... BIGIDEA.COM, http://www.bigidea.comlgames/
philnote.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2005).
232. CATECHUMEN (N'Lightning Software Development 2000).
233. Catechumen, N'LIGHTNING SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT, http://www.n-lightning.com/
Catechumen.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2005).
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Restore your spiritual health by finding scrolls containing God's
Word. In Catechumen, you survive by faith. When your faith gets too
low, pick up the many scrolls scattered across the lands to renew
your faith and continue your journey.
Descend deeper and deeper into the depths of the underworld.
Your journey will take you into the very heart of evil, through 18
hand-crafted, highly detailed levels. Each level you visit is unique
and each has its secrets you must uncover.
Rescue your captured Christian brethren. Your mentor and some
of his flock have been taken hostage by the evil Roman Empire, con-
trolled by Satan himself. The forces of evil and darkness will claim a
great victory if he does not survive! Take up this quest and fight for
the Lord!
234
Big Idea and N'Lightning Software Development are just two of a
growing number of companies producing video games with Chris-
tian themes. Capitalizing on the best selling Left Behind235 series
of books, Left Behind Games plans to release games based on the
fictional series,236 which itself is based on an interpretation of bib-
lical descriptions of end time events (eschatology) known as pre-
millennial dispensationalism. 237 Eschatology is a hotly debated
topic among Christians. While the games have not been released
at the time of the writing of this article, it may be assumed these
games will communicate the eschatological premises on which the
book series is based.
D. Educational Uses of Video Game Technology
The same technology that powers video games can be used for
education and training in ways that communicate particularized
messages. One example is AccuTouch Endovascular Simulation
System, a product of Immersion Medical, in which one can per-
form a simulated medical procedure. "Immersion Medical is now
working on a program that would map a patient's medical data
and download them in a computer, so the physician can practice
on the patient before actually working on him."23 "Immersion is
234. Id.
235. See generally TIM LAHAYE & JERRY B. JENKINS, LEFT BEHIND: A NOVEL OF
EARTH'S LAST DAYS (1995).
236. LEFT BEHIND GAMES, http://www.leftbehindgames.com (last visited Nov. 13, 2005).
237. See An Overview of End Times Views, LEFT BEHIND, http://www.leftbehind.com/
channelendtimes.asp (last visited Nov. 13, 2005).
238. Hazel Feigenblatt, Video Games Are Serious Business for Some Maryland Firms,
GAZETTE.NET, May 14, 2004, http://www.gazette.net/gazettearchive/2004200420/busi
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just one of the companies turning video game technology toward
serious uses in medicine, defense, education, telecommunications
and other fields."" 9 GRS Games developed Space Station: SIM,
240
"in which players build a space station, maintain it, run experi-
ments and give technical support."2 4' NASA, which assisted in the
development of Space Station: SIM, was interested in the game
"because its hyper-realistic nature gives the public[U a better un-
derstanding of what NASA does."2 42 Another such game is Res-
taurant Empire,2" a "real-time, three-dimensional game that puts
the player in charge of a restaurant, from balancing finances to
answering customer complaints."244 The game "has been used in
business schools and some universities, including Stanford and
Harvard."
2 45
Indeed, video games have become a subject of academic re-
search and scholarship. For example, Kurt Squire, an assistant
professor at the University of Wisconsin-Madison (UW-M) and a
research scientist at Wisconsin's Academic ADL Co-Lab, and
Constance Steinkuehler, a research fellow at the Academic ADL
Co-Lab and dissertator at UW-M, examine how video gamers
learn through playing their games. One of the games which
they have studied is Lineage.247 In an article on their research,
Squire and Steinkuehler describe Lineage as "a massive, multi-
player online game where thousands of players interact in real
time through avatars-such as a female elf-which are online
digital characters that represent the individual player."2 4' They
continue:
Despite fears of games "replacing" literate activities, Lineage play
is a thoroughly literate activity involving manipulation of texts, im-
ages, and symbols for making meaning and achieving particular
ends. If the ends-conducting sieges and defending castles-are not
ness/news/217160-1.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2005).
239. Id.
240. SPACE STATION: SIM, http://www.spacestationsim.com/products/ilndex.html (last
visited Nov. 13, 2005).
241. Feigenblatt, supra note 238.
242. Id.
243. RESTAURANT EMPIRE (Enlight Interactive Inc. 2003).
244. Feigenblatt, supra note 238.
245. Id.
246. Kurt Squire & Constance Steinkuehler, Meet the Gamers, LIBR. J., Apr. 15, 2005,
at 38.
247. LINEAGE (NCsoft 1998).
248. Squire & Steinkuehler, supra note 246, at 39.
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valued literacy activities, then the means surely are: researching
equipment, making maps, managing resources, investing currencies,
building models, designing strategies, debating facts and theories
and writing. Tons of writing.
Simply playing Lineage requires facility with text, particularly in
negotiating private, public, and other chat channels through which
text constantly streams in real time .... Outside of the game world,
[players] tell stories, post screen shots, write poetry, search data-
bases, post hints and walkthroughs, and generally "cuss and discuss"
all aspects of game play.
249
Squire and Steinkuehler describe the games they study as cre-
ating communities where communication of ideas occurs not only
outside the game, but as an essential part of the game itself. To
even play games such as Lineage, gamers must constantly "con-
vey a particularized message" with a great likelihood that this
message will be understood.250
E. Conclusion
Perhaps most, if not all, of today's video games should be found
to be speech simply because of the artistry involved in their vis-
ual displays and storylines. Perhaps they should be found to be
speech because entertainment is speech. Yet, such an approach
may lead to defining speech too broadly. In the case of video
games, it is unnecessary to take such a broad approach. From the
few games described above, it is clear that video games are a me-
dium of speech however one wants to define that term. Authors of
games can use them to convey messages about politics, religion,
social issues and probably any other subject matter which one can
imagine. With online games, the game becomes a medium for
communication between players, in which real communities are
formed. The educational value of such games is immense. Cer-
tainly some of what is being taught is troubling. That may create
a compelling state interest in restricting minors' access to such
games. It does not, however, create a plausible argument for de-
nying games the status of speech. Indeed, it does the opposite. It
is in large measure the unique ability of such games to educate
and shape the ways in which gamers think, particularly through
the particularized messages they deliver, which creates the con-
249. Id. at 39-40.
250. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 411 (1974) (per curiam).
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cerns which have motivated efforts to restrict minors' access to
them. It is the fact that such messages are capable of and are be-
ing understood that provokes the theory that they are somehow
responsible for increased violence among some of those who play
them. As Judge Limbaugh noted in Interactive Digital Software,
"either a 'medium' provides sufficient elements of communica-
tions and expressiveness to fall within the scope of the First
Amendment, or it does not."25' It is indeed, to quote his findings,
"dangerous" for courts to judge on a case-by-case basis whether
the expression conveyed by such a medium is worthy of being
speech.15 2 Whatever one may think about whether video games
should be subject to access restrictions, it is hard to deny that
they are a powerful medium for expression. As such, they deserve
the full protection of the Free Speech Clause of the First Amend-
ment. Restricting minors' access to them based on their contents,
therefore, requires strict scrutiny. The next section will examine
whether access restrictions can survive such scrutiny.
IV. MAY MINORS' ACCESS TO GRAPHICALLY VIOLENT VIDEO
GAMES BE RESTRICTED?
Despite what they say, courts are never in the business of protecting
speech per se, "mere" speech (a nonexistent animal); rather they are
in the business of classifying speech (as protected or regulatable) in
relation to a value-the health of the republic, the vigor of the econ-
omy, the maintenance of the status quo, the undoing of the status




Having shown that at least some video games are a medium of
speech and that any restrictions placed upon their access raises
the need for First Amendment scrutiny, the second question to be
addressed by this article remains: may minors' access to graphi-
cally violent games be restricted? Answering this question in-
volves examination of two issues: (1) are the First Amendment
251. Interactive Digital Software Ass'n v. St. Louis County, 200 F. Supp. 2d 1126, 1134
(E.D. Mo. 2002).
252. See id.
253. FISH, supra note 84, at 106.
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rights of minors different from the First Amendment rights of
adults and, if they are different, under what circumstances may
governments limit minors' access to speech that is protected as to
adults?; and (2) do those circumstances apply to graphically vio-
lent video games? The remainder of this article will address those
issues.
As Professor Fish's quote at the beginning of this section indi-
cates, the First Amendment, despite the declarations of many of
its defenders, is not some ultimate good before which all other
competing values must fall in the event of a conflict. It is, rather,
good because it advances other values which the Framers saw as
good. The same is still the case. When conflicts arise between
competing values, both identified as good, a careful weighing of
the competing interests is essential. Courts recognize this by
permitting content-based restrictions in the event of a compelling
interest, when the restrictions are narrowly tailored and use the
least restrictive means necessary to protect that interest.
In addressing the second question, this article analyzes the
competing interests at stake in the regulation of violent video
games to determine what limits, if any, should be placed on the
First Amendment's protection of any expressions which may be
conveyed by such games.
B. What Are the First Amendment Rights of Minors?
Minors clearly have some rights which are protected under the
Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. On the other hand,
those rights are not coextensive with the First Amendment rights
of adults. The seminal case for establishing that minors have less
extensive First Amendment rights than adults is Ginsberg v. New
York." 4 In Ginsberg, the Court had before it a New York statute
which prohibited the sale to minors of sexually explicit material
which was not obscene as to adults. 55 The statute was attacked
on the grounds that states may not restrict minors' access to
sexually related material which is protected as to adults.256 The
254. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
255. See id. at 631.
256. See id. at 636.
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Court rejected this contention.1 7 It explicitly recognized that "'the
power of the state to control the conduct of children reaches be-
yond the scope of its authority over adults."'25 8 The Court found
two interests which justified restricting minors' access to sexually
related material where "it was rational for the legislature to find
that the minors' exposure to such material might be harmful. 259
First, a parent's right of authority in his or her household "to di-
rect the rearing of [his or her] children"26 ° entitles him or her to
support from the state in the form of "laws designed to aid dis-
charge of that responsibility. '261 Second, the Court found that the
state had its own interest in 'safeguard[ing] [children] from
abuses' which might prevent their 'growth into free and inde-
pendent well-developed"' adults.26 2
The Court then explored whether the New York legislature
might rationally conclude that exposure to the material restricted
under the statute constituted an "abuse. 26 3 The statute in ques-
tion included a legislative finding that such material was "'a basic
factor in impairing the ethical and moral development of our
youth and a clear and present danger to the people of the
state. '' 2' The Court acknowledged that it was "doubtful that this
finding expresses an accepted scientific fact,"265 but nonetheless
held that "it was not irrational for the legislature to find that ex-
posure to" the sexually explicit material covered by the statute "is
harmful to minors." 266 It went on to note that while the scientific
evidence as to harm to "'the ethical and moral development of...
youth,"'267 if any, resulting from minors' exposure to such material
was uncertain, "'a causal link has not been disproved."'268 The
Court then held that it did "not demand of legislatures 'scientifi-
cally certain criteria of legislation."'269 Thus, the Court's decision
257. See id. at 637.
258. Id. at 638 (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944)).
259. Id. at 639.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 640 (quoting Prince, 321 U.S. at 165).
263. Id. at 641.
264. Id. (quoting N.Y. PENAL LAW app. 484-e (McKinney 1909)).
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id. (quoting N.Y. PENAL LAW app. 484-e (McKinney 1909)).
268. Id. at 642 (quoting C. Peter Magrath, The Obscenity Cases: Grapes of Roth, 1966
S. CT. REV. 7, 52).
269. Id. at 642-43 (quoting Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104, 110 (1911)).
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in Ginsberg can be accurately stated as permitting restrictions on
minors' access to expression which a legislature rationally finds
to be harmful to the ethical and moral development of youth with-
out the necessity of a high degree of scientific certainty support-
ing that finding.
This does not, of course, mean that government may restrict
minors' access to any material which any member of the commu-
nity or even a majority might object to a minor having. The case
which best demonstrates the limits of such restrictions is
Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville."' In Erznoznik, a manager of a
drive-in movie theater was prosecuted for violation of a city ordi-
nance that prohibited the exhibition of films displaying nudity on
a screen visible from a public street and place."' The ordinance
was justified, in part, as necessary to protect children from seeing
such displays. 2 The Court acknowledged Jacksonville's "un-
doubted police power to protect children."273 It also acknowledged
that government may more stringently control the access of mi-
nors to certain material than it may adults.274 Nonetheless, it
found that the city was not justified in imposing the restrictions
found in the ordinance in question. 5 It began by noting that the
First Amendment provides "significant" protections to minors and
that "only in relatively narrow and well-defined circumstances
may government bar public dissemination of protected materials
to them."276 Because the ordinance in question applied to any film
which displayed "any uncovered buttocks or breasts, irrespective
of context or pervasiveness," the Court found that its prohibition
exceeded those which were permissible. 7 The Court then de-
clared: "Speech that is neither obscene as to youths nor subject to
some other legitimate proscription cannot be suppressed solely to
protect the young from ideas or images that a legislative body
thinks unsuitable for them."27 In a footnote, the Court elaborated
on the First Amendment rights of minors, stating:
270. 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
271. Id. at 206-07.
272. Id. at 212.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. See id. at 214.
276. Id. at 212-13.
277. Id. at 213.
278. Id. at 213-14.
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The First Amendment rights of minors are not "co-extensive with
those of adults." . . . "[A] State may permissibly determine that, at
least in some precisely delineated areas, a child-like someone in a
captive audience-is not possessed of that full capacity for individual
choice which is the presupposition of First Amendment guarantees."
... In assessing whether a minor has the requisite capacity for indi-
vidual choice the age of the minor is a significant factor.
2 79
The issue, then, is whether graphically violent video games are
"obscene as to youths [or] subject to some other legitimate pro-
scription."2 0 Unless such games also contain sexually explicit ma-
terial which would without more fall within the existing defini-
tion of material harmful to minors, the issue becomes whether
the definition of "obscene as to youth" might be expanded to in-
clude such graphic displays of violence or whether such displays
constitute another legitimate basis for proscription.
The Court has not limited governments to restrictions on what
minors may access solely to sexually explicit material that is
harmful to minors. In FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,s1 the Court
approved a declaratory order granted by the Federal Communica-
tions Commission which held that a radio station "'could have
been the subject of administrative sanctions"' 28 2 for broadcasting
George Carlin's "Filthy Words" monologue.283 The complaint had
been filed by a man who averred that he had heard the broadcast
while in his car with his young son.2' The FCC found that the
language used in the monologue was "indecent" pursuant to a
federal statute.2" Addressing Pacifica's First Amendment claim
that government may not "restrict the public broadcast of inde-
cent language [under] any circumstances,"2 6 the Court rejected
the claim that speech must be obscene in order to be subject to re-
279. Id. at 214 n.l (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S.
503, 515 (1969) (Stewart, J., concurring); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 649-50
(1968) (Stewart, J., concurring)).
280. Id. at 213.
281. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
282. Id. at 730.
283. See id. at 750-51. The monologue was based on seven words, "shit, piss, fuck,
cunt, cocksucker, motherfucker, and tits." Id. at 751. I list these words in the article not
for shock value but for later comparison between the harmfulness actually found by the
Court from the use of these words in the context of Carlin's monologue and the content in
question in the video games which are the target of the statutes and ordinances at issue in
this article.
284. Id. at 726.
285. Id. at 732.
286. Id. at 744.
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strictions on its broadcast.2"7 Acknowledging that Carlin's mono-
logue was indeed speech 288 and that speech may not be sup-
pressed merely because it is offensive,28 9 the Court nevertheless
held that the words used by Carlin were offensive "for the same
reasons that obscenity offends,"29 ° and that their restriction was
constitutional.29' In a footnote, the Court quoted, with apparent
approval, the FCC's finding that "'[o]bnoxious, gutter language
describing [sexual and excretory bodily functions] has the effect of
debasing and brutalizing human beings."'2 92 As one basis for its
holding, the Court, citing Ginsberg, raised the welfare of children
and the government's interests in the "'well-being of its youth'
and in supporting 'parents' claim to authority in their own house-
hold.' ' 293 These interests, the Court declared, "amply justify spe-
cial treatment of indecent broadcasting."294 The Court emphasized
that its holding extended to speech which was not obscene by con-
cluding: "We simply hold that when the Commission finds that a
pig has entered the parlor, the exercise of its regulatory power
does not depend on proof that the pig is obscene."2 9 In his concur-
rence, Justice Powell noted the Court's past recognition of "soci-
ety's right to 'adopt more stringent controls on communicative
materials available to youths than on those available to
adults."'296 In part, he argued that "such speech may have a
deeper and more lasting negative effect on a child than on an
adult. For these reasons, society may prevent the general dis-
semination of such speech to children, leaving to parents the de-
cision as to what speech of this kind their children shall hear."297
In Bering v. Share,298 the Supreme Court of Washington pro-
vided further support for the proposition that restrictions on
speech which might be received by minors are not limited to ob-
287. See id. at 750-51.
288. Id. at 744.
289. Id. at 745.
290. Id. at 746.
291. See id. at 750-51.
292. Id. at 746 n.23.
293. Id. at 749 (quoting Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639, 640 (1968)).
294. Id. at 750.
295. Id. at 750-51.
296. Id. at 757 (Powell, J., concurring) (quoting Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S.
205, 212 (1975)).
297. Id. at 758.
298. 721 P.2d 918 (Wash. 1986) (en banc).
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scenity. In Bering, physicians had successfully sought an injunc-
tion against abortion protesters which prohibited their oral use of
words "'murder,' 'kill,' and their derivatives."299 The Washington
Supreme Court found that this injunction was constitutional inso-
far as the prohibition applied when minors were present, but un-
constitutional when they were not.3 °0 In remanding the case, the
court suggested that the trial court consider evidence as to an ap-
propriate age limit of potential hearers for application of this
condition.30' The basis for affirming the injunction when children
were present was the finding that the prohibited words "had 'in-
flicted trauma upon the children overhearing such references. ' '302
Citing Ginsberg, the court relied in part on the "'primary respon-
sibility' of parents and teachers "'to direct the rearing of their
children."' 30 3 It also relied on the state's interest in protecting mi-
nors "from the potentially harmful effects caused by the pro-
scribed speech."3 4 It characterized these harmful effects as
"physical and psychological abuse."30 5 In addition to Ginsberg, the
Bering court relied heavily on Pacifica, especially Justice Powell's
concurrence in that case, to support its holding.0 6
From these cases, it is clear that while minors have First
Amendment rights upon which government may not infringe,
those rights are not coextensive with the First Amendment rights
of adults and the limitations upon those rights are not limited to
sexually explicit material harmful to minors. The test for whether
a given category of expression is subject to restrictions as to non-
adult recipients is whether that speech "impair[s] the ethical and
moral development of ... youth.' 30 7 Such an impairment may be
found where the speech in question "'has the effect of debasing
and brutalizing human beings."'30 8 The state is not required to
prove this impairment with a high degree of scientific certainty to
justify the restriction. 3 9 To hold that sexually explicit material is
299. See id. at 921.
300. See id. at 936.
301. Id.
302. Id. at 933.
303. Id. at 934 (quoting Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968)).
304. Id.
305. Id. at 935.
306. See id. at 934-35.
307. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 641 (quoting N.Y. PENAL LAW app. 484-e (McKinney 1909)).
308. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 723, 746 n.23 (1978).
309. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 642-43.
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the only category of speech which may be limited as to minors is
simply to misread or to ignore the body of cases which address
the issue of the state's ability to restrict expression received by
minors. To require a high degree of scientific certainty of harm is
likewise to misread or to ignore the body of cases which address
the issue of the states' ability to restrict expression received by
minors.
In Reno v. ACLU,31° the Court stuck down the Communications
Decency Act ("the CDA"), which was aimed at restricting the ac-
cess of minors to "patently offensive" and "indecent" speech avail-
able via the Internet.31" ' In doing so, the Court distinguished the
facts and restrictions at issue in Ginsberg and Pacifica from those
related to the CDA. One distinction which the Court noted was
the lack of a parental consent provision whereby parents could
permit their minor children to have access to the regulated con-
tent.1 2 Certainly, any restrictions on minors' access to graphically
violent video games will need to have such a parental consent
provision. Another problem was the lack of a definition for the
term "indecency."3"3 Again, restrictions on access of minors to
graphically violent video games will need to define what depic-
tions and displays are subject to the restrictions. These defini-
tions, however, need not be so precise that much of what is in-
tended to be regulated can escape the restrictions simply by a few
minor changes which leave images and interaction which create
the same concerns. There is no reason why a modified Miller
definition, such as that used in American Amusement Machine,1 4
should not provide sufficient notice to publishers of what content
is covered.
The Reno decision further noted that the indecency standards
apply to broadcast media, which historically has not been af-
forded full First Amendment protection because of the scarcity of
available frequencies and its invasiveness, while the Internet has
no such history, scarcity or, according to the Court, invasive-
ness.31" Here, the Court's statement needs to be placed in context.
310. 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
311. See id. at 849.
312. See id. at 865.
313. Id.
314. See Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 115 F. Supp. 2d 943, 966-67 (S.D.
Ind. 2000).
315. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 867.
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The CDA restricted adult access to speech protected as to them in
order to restrict minors' access to such speech.316 The FCC's inde-
cency standards at issue in Pacifica did the same thing.317 Both
Reno and Pacifica also recognized that the government has a
compelling state interest in restricting minors' access to some
speech which is protected as to adults.31 Unlike the regulations
at issue in Reno and Pacifica, the proposed restrictions on minors'
access to graphically violent video games do not impose such re-
strictions on adult access. In this regard, the restrictions are no
more burdensome to adults than the restrictions approved in
Ginsberg. Indeed, the only difference between these proposed
regulations and those upheld in Ginsberg is the nature of the con-
tent. The Court's holding in Pacifica establishes that the First
Amendment permits restrictions of minors' access to content
other than that which is sexually explicit, but not obscene to
adults.319 Thus, these distinctions in Reno in no way limit the ap-
plication of Ginsberg and Pacifica to restrictions on minors' access
to graphically violent video games. If speech which has the "ef-
fect of debasing and brutalizing human beings" is harmful to mi-
nors when conveyed by broadcast media, it does not become non-
harmful merely because it is conveyed by another medium. In-
deed, one of the central premises of this article is that the inter-
active nature of video games magnifies the potential "effect of de-
basing and brutalizing human beings."
There is one area in which Reno may impose a limitation on
such enactments. The Court distinguished the restrictions upheld
in Ginsberg from those struck down in Reno by noting that the
former's restrictions applied to persons under the age of seven-
teen, while the CDA's restrictions applied to persons under the
age of eighteen. ° Any restrictions on minors' access to graphi-
cally violent video games should end no later than a person's sev-
enteenth birthday.
Scholars have debated the extent to which minors possess First
Amendment rights and the age at which full First Amendment
rights should vest. In 2004, the Chicago-Kent Law Review held a
316. See id. at 874.
317. See id. at 875.
318. See id.; Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 749.
319. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 749.
320. Reno, 521 U.S. at 865-66.
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symposium on this issue. My exploration here is limited to the
question posed by Professor Amitai Etzioni in an essay published
in their Law Review's symposium edition: "When freedom of
speech comes into conflict with the protection of children, how
should this conflict be resolved?" ' Professor Etzioni's conclusion
is that minors' free speech rights may be limited beyond those of
adults when a compelling interest exists for doing so.322 Indeed,
he declares that "[tihe position that children have full speech
rights is untenable in the face of' case law precedent to the con-
trary.323 He cites Professor Michael Wald's examination of social
science research that "'younger children, generally those under
10-12 years old, do lack the cognitive abilities and judgmental
skills necessary to make decisions about major events which
could severely affect their lives.'324 Professor Etzioni then quotes
Colin Macleod and David Archard for the conclusion that "chil-
dren 'are seen as "becoming" rather than "being". . . whose moral
status gradually changes.""'32 Professor Etzioni concludes that
"whatever one considers the purpose and merit of the First
Amendment-whether to ensure a free exchange of ideas, to
maintain liberty, to enrich one's life, and so on-none of this ap-
plies to toddlers." '326 One would hope that courts would recognize
this principle and, if faced with such a law, uphold restrictions on
access to graphically violent video games which apply to children
under the age of ten to twelve.
But this conclusion begs the question of what rights older,
more mature minors have or should have to access speech. It is
older minors who are likely to have sufficient autonomy from par-
ents to purchase or otherwise access graphically violent video
games. None of the courts that have decided the restrictions on
minors' access to such games have had before them restrictions
targeted only at younger minors, and there is no evidence from
the case reports that they were asked to consider such restric-
tions or that the laws in question permitted any such narrower
321. Amitai Etzioni, On Protecting Children from Speech, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3, 3
(2004).
322. See id. at 52-53.
323. Id. at 52.
324. Id. at 46 (quoting Michael S. Wald, Children's Rights: A Framework for Analysis,
12 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 255, 274 (1979)).
325. Id. (quoting David Archard & Colin M. Macleod, Introduction, in THE MORAL AND
POLITICAL STATUS OF CHILDREN 1, 2, 4 (David Archard & Colin M. Macleod eds., 2002)).
326. Id. at 47.
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application. If such restrictions are enacted, Professor Etzioni's
argument and the findings he cites should certainly be given seri-
ous consideration. The question for now is whether older minors'
access to graphically violent video games may be restricted. If it
can, then there would certainly be no problem restricting younger
minors' access.
Professor Catherine J. Ross would extend First Amendment
protection to mature minors "in order to enhance the meaningful
exercise of another right, such as the right to abortion, contracep-
tion or free exercise of religion" even in the face of parental oppo-
sition.3 27 Assuming her views were adopted, the issue would be
whether access to graphically violent video games, as a genre, is
necessary to exercise any other fundamental constitutional right.
It is hard to see how that is the case. Few, if any, of the games
which are likely to be covered by such restrictions appear to have
messages related to any fundamental rights which minors pos-
sess. If a specific game has such value, it should pass a modified
Miller test. An as-applied challenge would suffice to protect mi-
nors' access to such games. That some graphically violent games
might conceivably have such a value is no basis for finding bans
on minors' access to such games as a class facially unconstitu-
tional. In an as-applied challenge, a trier of fact or court could
look at a given game as a whole to determine whether such al-
leged valuable content was sufficient to overcome a finding that
the game was harmful to minors because of its violence or
whether it was the equivalent of "[a] quotation from Voltaire in
the flyleaf of a book."328 Only if "'the dominant theme of the mate-
rial taken as a whole appeals to [a morbid] interest' in" 29 violence
could a court hold that the restrictions imposed applied to any
given game. Likewise, Judge Posner's arguments about minors'
access to violence in literature can be addressed by this limitation
on any restriction on minors' access to graphically violent video
games. If a violent game has literary value as to minors, the gen-
eral restriction against minors having access to graphically vio-
lent video games would not apply to that specific game. Courts
should have no more of a problem making such a determination
327. See Catherine J. Ross, An Emerging Right for Mature Minors to Receive Informa-
tion, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 223, 274 (1999).
328. Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229, 231 (1972).
329. A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Att'y Gen. of
Mass., 383 U.S. 413, 418 (1965) (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957)).
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than they have had in applying this exception to prohibitions on
sexually explicit material that is allegedly harmful to minors.
Marjorie Heins wrote a "Reply to Amitai Etzioni," in which she
argues for full First Amendment protection for minors. ° Ms.
Heins doubts the "assumption that minors are harmed by sexual
or violent content in art and entertainment."33 1 She calls Profes-
sor Etzioni's essay "thoughtful, well-intentioned, but ultimately
superficial."332 Ms. Heins limited her objections to government-
imposed restrictions on minors' access to speech, expressing ap-
proval of parental and teacher-imposed restrictions. 3 She argues
that "words like protection and harm mask moral or normative
judgments about what is appropriate for youth,"334 and asserts
that "education, not censorship" is the solution to "inculcation of
good sexual values and socialization into acceptable behavior (in-
cluding alternatives to violence)."335 Here, one notices a weakness
in Ms. Heins' argument. She approves and even finds proper pa-
rental and teacher-imposed restrictions, presumably because of
their roles in "inculcation . .. and socialization" of "values" and
"acceptable behavior," but then asserts that restrictions when
imposed by government are not a "remedy for what's troublesome
in mass media entertainment."336 If restrictions are not a "rem-
edy" and only education will suffice to counter "troublesome"
messages in mass media, then why does she approve of parents
and teachers using restrictions? If the argument is that the First
Amendment does not restrict parents and teachers in the same
way it does legislators, then she should state that as her objec-
tion. If she is not merely conceding that the First Amendment
does not apply to parental and teacher-imposed restrictions, but
finds such restrictions proper, then why, absent First Amend-
ment constraints, would not government-imposed restrictions
that aid parents and teachers in their proper roles be beneficial?
In short, either restrictions are beneficial in "inculcation ... and
socialization" of minors in acceptable values and behavior, or they
330. See generally Marjorie Heins, On Protecting Children-From Censorship: A Reply
to Amitai Etzioni, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 229 (2004).
331. Id. at 229.
332. Id.
333. See id. at 230.
334. Id. at 231.
335. Id. at 231-32.
336. Id.
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are not. Past Supreme Court precedent in the areas of sexually
explicit material harmful to minors and indecency would indicate
that access restrictions are constitutional where legislative bodies
act rationally in finding that the restrictions are beneficial in
forming the values of minors, at least where the content being re-
stricted debases or brutalizes humans. Governments may assist
parents in limiting minors' access to such content without paren-
tal consent.
Ms. Heins spends a substantial portion of her article attacking
the use of Internet filters in general and the Children's Internet
Protection Act ("CIPA") in particular. 337 The Supreme Court,
however, has now held that libraries may use filters to restrict
the access of minors and adults to certain content and, as to mi-
nors, those restrictions extend to sexually explicit material which
is harmful to minors, but not obscene as to adults. 38 Again, the
Court has rejected the proposition that minors have First
Amendment rights coextensive with adults. The question is why
graphic displays of violence should be protected as to minors
when "girlie magazines" and "seven filthy words" should not.
Here, Ms. Heins attacks the validity of the social science research
showing harm to minors from their exposure to violent media.339
Like Judge Posner, she notes that "violence is an eternal theme in
art, literature, and entertainment. '340 Also like Judge Posner, she
fails to make the common sense distinction between Brutus slay-
ing Julius Caesar in Shakespeare's play, whether read or viewed
337. See id. at 235-39.
338. United States v. Am. Libr. Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194 (2003). Ms. Heins acknowledges the
Supreme Court's upholding of CIPA, but criticizes that decision. See Heins, supra note
330, at 237-39. In fairness to Ms. Heins, this author must disclose that I too objected to
the constitutionality of the Children's Internet Protection Act. See Laughlin, supra note 7,
at 257-58. Unlike Ms. Heins, however, I did not object in general to public libraries using
filters, but to a Congressional mandate which I believed did not permit adults to "readily
and anonymously bypass [ the filters," id. at 266, to Congress usurping, through its spend-
ing power, the right of local library boards to determine if filters were needed in their li-
braries and, if so, how they should be implemented, see id. at 279, and to its denying par-
ents the option of requesting that their minor children be permitted unfiltered access to
the internet in public libraries. Id. at 277. The Court read CIPA as requiring libraries to
disable filters upon the request of an adult without his or her being required "'to explain
... why he was asking a site to be unblocked or the filtering to be disabled."' Am. Libr.
Ass'n, 539 U.S. at 209. This removed one of my three objections to CIPA, though I found
this reading of the statute unwarranted. Unlike Ms. Heins, I did not object to and, in fact,
argued for government having a compelling interest in restricting the access of minors to
the speech targeted by CIPA. See Laughlin, supra note 7, at 253-58.
339. See Heins, supra note 330, at 239-49.
340. Id. at 239.
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as acted on stage or in a movie, and being a virtual assassin in an
interactive video game. To compare the two is a category mistake.
Making such a distinction should be no more difficult than the
distinction the Court was able to make between the content un-
protected as to minors in Ginsberg and the content protected as to
minors in Erznoznik.
Ms. Heins' main point, however, is that media violence re-
search, none of which was specifically targeted to the effects of
playing graphically violent video games, was flawed and that
competing studies and reviews of the literature as a whole do not
support the conclusion that violent media contributes to actual
increases in aggressive behavior.34' She further notes the decline
in violent crime -among youths during the past decade "even while
violence in entertainment has increased" to refute the "assump-
tion" that viewing violent media increases aggression. In any field
of scientific inquiry, disputes as to the conclusions to be drawn
from research studies will arise. This is an inherent and healthy
aspect of scientific research. Science is not static and occasionally
later research draws conclusions which entirely overturn "laws of
nature" which were long held to be certain. That Ms. Heins can
find experts to refute the body of literature that finds a correla-
tion between viewing violent media and aggressive behavior is
not, therefore, surprising. Nonetheless, I am inclined to agree
with Ms. Heins to the following extent: the social science data
does not conclusively and with a high degree of certainty demon-
strate that minors who view violent media will, as a direct result,
commit violent acts. If a high degree of scientific certainty were
required to justify restrictions on minors' access to speech, I
would have to agree with Ms. Heins and Judge Posner that the
proposed restrictions are not constitutional. Of course, such a
level of certainty seldom exists and for that reason the Court does
not require it to find a compelling state interest in restricting mi-
nors' access to sexually explicit material which is not obscene as
to adults and to indecency. 42 The issue, then, is not whether
there is a high degree of certainty that playing graphically violent
video games is the cause of incidents like the school shootings
that have motivated the restrictions at issue in this article. The
issue is whether it is rational for legislators to conclude that ex-
341. See id. at 239-49.
342. See, e.g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 641-43 (1968).
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posure to the graphically violent video games covered by the stat-
ute "is harmful to minors." I have yet to read a single article or
court opinion that adequately explains why such a finding is irra-
tional or why a greater degree of certainty of harm is required to
restrict access to graphically violent video games than is required
to restrict access to "girlie magazines" or "filthy words." Indeed,
few articles or court opinions even address that issue, but rather
offer conclusory statements to the effect that non-obscene, sexu-
ally explicit material is unprotected as to minors because the
Court has said so, and it has not said the same as to graphically
violent video games. When reading the court opinions striking
down restrictions on violent video games, one is left with the in-
escapable conclusion that the authors of those opinions would re-
ject restrictions on minors' access to non-obscene, sexually ex-
plicit material as well were they not bound by prior Supreme
Court precedents. As it is, they will refuse to extend that prece-
dent beyond the narrow category of speech at issue in those cases
even if the logic behind the precedent would lead to such an ex-
tension.
Case law clearly shows that minors' First Amendment rights
are not coextensive with those of adults. The Supreme Court has
found that society has a compelling interest in protecting minors
from some speech which is protected as to adults. It has not re-
quired a showing of a high degree of scientific certainty of psycho-
logical or other measurable harm to justify such restrictions. It
has, instead, recognized that "the ethical and moral development
of ... youth" provide sufficient justification for such restrictions.
So long as parents have the right and ability to introduce their
minor children to such expressive content when they deem ap-
propriate, such restrictions are permissible. Restrictions may ap-
ply to speech other than sexually explicit material, including ver-
bal indecency, at least where it "has the effect of debasing and
brutalizing human beings." The next question to consider, then, is
whether the compelling interests which the Court found permit-
ted restricting minors' access to "girlie magazines" in Ginsberg
and "filthy words" in Pacifica exist as to graphically violent video
games.
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V. DO THE FACTORS WHICH COURTS HAVE FOUND JUSTIFY
RESTRICTING MINORS' ACCESS TO SEXUALLY EXPLICIT MATERIAL
AND INDECENCY APPLY TO GRAPHICALLY VIOLENT VIDEO GAMES?
A strategic mistake made to date by many proponents of re-
strictions on minors' access to violent video games has been their
efforts to justify such restrictions based on studies that show ac-
tual psychological harm from their play. There are two problems
with this approach. First, while there is a significant amount of
evidence to support such a finding, it is by no means undisputed.
One can find studies that conclude otherwise. Thus, triers of fact
in these cases are faced with competing expert testimony from
which they might reasonably conclude that the evidence is incon-
clusive. While this author believes the weight of such evidence fa-
vors a finding of harm, a finding to the contrary probably is not
clearly erroneous. Second, and more importantly, such a strategy
is unnecessary as the Court has stated that a high degree of sci-
entific certainty of harm is not necessary to justify restrictions on
minors' access to expression which may impair their ethical or
moral development. Indeed, psychological harm is not the same
as impairment to ethical or moral development. One may have
fine psychological health and nonetheless be unethical or im-
moral. Society establishes its own ethical and moral standards
without reference to scientific studies. Societal ethical and moral
standards will vary over time and are not subject to objective de-
termination. 43
For example, most Americans may not consider a teenage boy's
interest in "girlie magazines" as reflective of, or contributing to, a
psychological pathology, but his development of attitudes toward
women as mere objects for his pleasure does reflect, in the minds
of many, an ethical or moral failing. It would appear that this was
the basis for finding a compelling state interest in upholding the
statute at issue in Ginsberg. Similarly, even though playing vio-
343. For example, at one time, the use of contraceptives even by married couples was
considered immoral and was illegal in many states and under the federal Comstock Act.
Today, many American couples of childbearing years use contraceptives and find no moral
fault in doing so. The Supreme Court, following the shift in public opinion, struck down
the laws prohibiting the availability and use of contraceptives by married couples in Gris-
wold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), and subsequently extended that holding to un-
married adults in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), and to minors in Carey v.
Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
[Vol. 40:481
PLAYING GAMES WITH THE FIRST AMENDMENT
lent video games may not create a pathology resulting in future
psychological problems and possibly even violent acts toward oth-
ers, it may nonetheless cause one to develop an insensitivity to-
ward one's fellow human beings and their suffering. If "the effect
of debasing and brutalizing human beings" flowing from Carlin's
Filthy Words monologue was sufficient to justify the restrictions
upheld in Pacifica, such effects flowing from graphically violent
video games must certainly justify restrictions on minors' access
to those games. Nothing in Carlin's monologue was designed to
entertain the recipient through graphic depictions of brutal acts
of violence in which the recipient himself or herself takes part. If
a high degree of scientific certainty of actual harm was not
needed to justify the restrictions in Ginsberg and Pacifica, it cer-
tainly is not needed to justify the restrictions enacted in Indian-
apolis, St. Louis County, and Washington state. Attempts to jus-
tify the restrictions on using the scientific studies have permitted
courts to evade the reasoning in Ginsberg and Pacifica. Posner's
well-written opinion hides his lack of consideration of the state-
ment in Ginsberg that a high degree of scientific certainty is not a
requirement and the clear implication from Pacifica that the
ethical and moral well-being of children may be impaired by ex-
pression other than that which is sexually explicit. His opinion
does not adequately address why interactive video games involv-
ing the player in simulated acts of extreme violence create less of
a compelling interest than the displays in "girlie magazines" or
the use of George Carlin's seven filthy words.
With that said, there is considerable research finding that sig-
nificant exposure to violent media contributes to greater aggres-
siveness and even violence in boys.3" These studies and their
findings are not without critics.345 Nonetheless, a report released
by the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transporta-
tion concluded that significant exposure to violence on television
has a number of negative effects on viewers, including the promo-
344. See, e.g., Etzioni, supra note 321, at 35-36 (citing SISSELA BOK, MAYHEM: VIO-
LENCE AS PUBLIC ENTERTAINMENT 57 (1998); MONROE M. LEFTOWITZ ET AL., GROWING UP
TO BE VIOLENT: A LONGITUDINAL STUDY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF AGGRESSION 115 (1977);
L. Rowell Huesmann et al., Stability of Aggression Over Time and Generations, 20 DEV.
PSYCHOL. 1120 (1984)).
345. See, e.g., id. at 36 n.167 (citing MARJORIE HEINS, NOT IN FRONT OF THE CHILDREN:
"INDECENCY," CENSORSHIP, AND THE INNOCENCE OF YOUTH 248-50 (2001); Jonathan L.
Freedman, Effect of Television Violence on Aggressiveness, 96 PSYCHOL. BULL. 227, 241-43
(1984)).
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tion of violent behavior.346 After discussing these and other stud-
ies, Professor Amitai Etzioni concluded that the data on the
harmful effects of media violence "strongly support[s] the need to
protect children from harmful material."347 While studies of vio-
lent video games have a more recent history, a number of these
studies have found a correlation between playing violent video
games and heightened aggressive thoughts and behavior.348 These
studies add further weight to Professor Saunders' argument that
such games cause real, measurable harm to minors.349
Indeed, playing violent video games has been identified as one
of several characteristics of minors who have become school
shooters. The National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime
studied eighteen incidents of school shootings.' The study's con-
clusions are instructive and warn against drawing too tight a
connection between playing such games or any other single factor
and school shootings. First, the report warned: "The origins of
human violence are complex. Thinkers, historians, and scientists
have explored the issue for centuries, but answers remain elusive.
The roots of a violent act are multiple, intricate, and inter-
346. See Edith Fairman Cooper, Television Violence: A Survey of Selected Social Science
Research Linking Violent Program Viewing with Aggression in Children and Society,
CONG. RES. REP. 95-593, at 2 (Sept. 1, 1995).
347. Etzioni, supra note 321, at 39.
348. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 6, at 113-22; Craig A. Anderson et al., Violent
Video Games: Specific Effects of Violent Content on Aggressive Thoughts and Behavior, in
ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 199, 199-249 (2004); Douglas A. Gentile
et al., The Effects of Violent Video Game Habits on Adolescent Hostility, Aggressive Behav-
iors, and School Performance, 27 J. ADOLESCENCE 5, 5-22 (2004); Eric Uhlmann & Jane
Swanson, Exposure to Violent Video Games Increases Automatic Aggressiveness, 27 J.
ADOLESCENCE 41, 41-52 (2004).
349. Saunders, supra note 21, at 62-78. On March 9, 2005, Senator Joseph Lieberman
introduced the Children and Media Research Advancement Act ("the CAMRA Act") "to au-
thorize funding for the establishment of a program on children and the media within the
National Institute of Child Health and Human Development to study the role and impact
of electronic media in the development of children." 151 CONG. REC. S2394 (daily ed. Mar.
9, 2005). One of the findings proposed in the legislation is as follows:
There are important gaps in our knowledge about the role of electronic
media and in particular, the newer interactive digital media, in children's
and adolescents' [sic] healthy development. The consequences of very early
screen usage by babies and toddlers on children's [sic] cognitive growth are
not yet understood, nor has a research base been established on the psycho-
logical consequences of high definition interactive media and other format
differences for child and adolescent viewers.
Id. at S2396. Video games are specifically mentioned as one of the media to be studied un-
der this legislation.
350. See MARY ELLEN O'TOOLE, FBI ACAD., THE SCHOOL SHOOTER: A THREAT ASSESS-
MENT PERSPECTIVE 1-2 (2002).
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twined."351 The study found that a school shooter's "behavior at
school is affected by the entire range of experiences and influ-
ences. No one factor is decisive. By the same token, however, no
one factor is completely without effect."352
Many of its findings go against conventional wisdom. For ex-
ample, despite public perception to the contrary, "[aldolescent vio-
lence in general, and homicides in particular" have not increased
dramatically over the past decade. 3 In fact, as Marjorie Heins
observed,354 youth violence has declined.355 Further, the study
found that media coverage has painted an inaccurate portrait of
school shooters. 6 These findings caution against the tendency to
isolate any single factor as the cause or even as the most signifi-
cant cause of school shootings.5 7 Nonetheless, the study found
that one common characteristic of school shooters was "an un-
usual fascination with movies, TV shows, computer games, music
videos or printed material that focus intensively on themes of vio-
lence, hatred, control, power, death, and destruction," and that
they spent "inordinate amounts of time playing video games with
violent themes, and seem[ed] more interested in the violent im-
ages than in the game itself."358
Having explored the scientific evidence of harm and the FBI's
study of school shooters, it must be admitted that if one's motiva-
tion for limiting minors' access to violent video games is to reduce
the risk of school shootings, courts are likely to find that the inci-
dents, however tragic, are too rare and the overall significance of
violent video games as a contributing factor is too small to justify,
by itself, restrictions on such access. While the weight of the evi-
dence seems to favor fascination with violent video games as a
factor in school shootings, it is likely that this fascination is as
351. Id. at 1.
352. Id. at 4.
353. Id. at 2.
354. See Heins, supra note 330, at 248.
355. O'TOOLE, supra note 350, at 2; see also 2005 Index of Child Well-Being, FOUNDA-
TION FOR CHILD DEVELOPMENT, http://www.ffcd.org(PDFs/CWIFastFactsViolentCrime.
pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 2005) (showing a "dramatic reduction" in violent youth crime and
victimization since it peaked in the mid-1990s to rates well below even those of 1975, and
listing as factors which might have contributed to this trend "the substitution of indoor
video games and computer entertainment for outdoor activities").
356. See O'TOOLE, supra note 350, at 2.
357. See id. at 15.
358. Id. at 20.
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much a symptom of the underlying complexity of problems which
lead to the shootings as it is a contributing factor itself. It is
probably fair to say that the fascination is both a symptom and a
further contributing factor. Removing violent video games, how-
ever, will not remove the other contributing factors and will not,
by itself, solve the problem. Studies on the effects of violent video
games are ongoing and may add further weight to such a justifi-
cation, but such a justification is not needed and should not be
demanded by courts considering the constitutionality of restric-
tions on minors' access to these games. As has already been
noted, a showing of strong scientific evidence of measurable harm
or incontrovertible causation between exposure to particular
classes of content and actual harmful or even illegal acts is not
required. Parental and societal interest in rearing minors to
value and respect their fellow humans, rather than to debase the
value of others by participating in games in which they commit
brutal acts of violence against very human-looking characters as
a form of entertainment, is sufficient to support restrictions.
Some may argue that even if developing such values in minors
formed a sufficient basis to support restrictions on access to cer-
tain expression in the past, such a basis may no longer be suffi-
cient. Citing Lawrence v. Texas,359 a federal district court judge in
United States v. Extreme Associates, Inc.36° held that the applica-
tion of the federal obscenity statutes to a distributor of obscene
material through the mails and on the Internet was unconstitu-
tional.361 In Lawrence, the Supreme Court struck down a state
law which criminalized homosexual sodomy.362 The court in Ex-
treme Associates read Lawrence as prohibiting the application of a
"moral code" as a sufficient state interest to justify a law's intru-
sion into an individual's personal and private life.363 In so doing,
359. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
360. 352 F. Supp. 2d 578 (W.D. Pa. 2005).
361. See id. at 579-80, 591-92.
362. See 539 U.S. at 578-79.
363. 352 F. Supp. 2d at 591. The court notes: "It cannot be seriously disputed that, his-
torically, the government's purpose in completely banning the distribution of sexually ex-
plicit obscene material ... was to uphold the community sense of morality." Id. at 592. It
went on to declare:
After Lawrence, however, upholding the public sense of morality is not
even a legitimate state interest that can justify infringing one's liberty inter-
est to engage in consensual sexual conduct in private .... Therefore, this his-
torically asserted state interest certainly cannot rise to the level of a compel-
ling interest, as is required under the strict scrutiny test.
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the court cited Justice Scalia's dissent in Lawrence, in which he
asserted that the majority opinion in that case called into ques-
tion the constitutionality of laws, including obscenity laws, which
were based on a state's desire to maintain a "moral code" of con-
duct.3" The court went on to cite several scholars who shared
similar views.365
The Extreme Associates court then, however, went on to explore
two justifications which the government advanced as sufficient
state interests to justify the application of the obscenity laws to
the facts at issue: protecting children from viewing obscene mate-
rials, and protecting unwitting adults from inadvertent exposure
to obscene material.366 In doing so, the court explicitly refused to
declare the obscenity statutes facially unconstitutional, but
rather relied on an "as applied" analysis. 67 Given the court's in-
sistence that a "moral code" is, after Lawrence, an unconstitu-
tional justification for a law, this seems strange. Particularly no-
table was the court's lack of discussion of the impermissibility of
the use of a "moral code" justification when analyzing the first of
the government's justifications, protecting children from viewing
obscene materials.36 Instead, the court focused its attention on
the use of less restrictive means as a means to serve that inter-
est.369 Yet it failed to explain why the government could legiti-
mately have an interest to serve in protecting children from view-
ing obscene materials if advancing a "moral code" is unconstitu-
tional. One could speculate as to why the court refused to take
this obvious approach in light of its view that "moral codes" are
unconstitutional after Lawrence, but such speculation would lack
any support from the court's opinion. In any event, it is far from
Id. at 593 (internal citations omitted). The Court even appears to doubt that "the asserted
interest of protecting unwitting adults from inadvertent exposure to the offensive material
were found to be a compelling one." Id.
364. Id. at 590 (citing Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 590 (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
365. Id. at 590-91 (citing Gary D. Allison, Sanctioning Sodomy: The Supreme Court
Liberates Gay Sex and Limits State Power to Vindicate the Moral Sentiments of the People,
39 TULSA L. REV. 95, 145-48 (2003); Mark Cenite, Federalizing or Eliminating Online Ob-
scenity Law as an Alternative to Contemporary Community Standards, 9 COMM. L. & POL'Y
25, 25 (2004); Calvin Massey, The New Formalism: Requiem for Tiered Scrutiny?, 6 U. PA.
J. CONST. L. 945, 964-65 (2004); James W. Paulsen, The Significance of Lawrence, 41
HOUS. LAW. 32, 37 (2004); Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The "Fundamental
Right" That Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1945 (2004)).
366. Id. at 592-95.
367. See id. at 591.
368. See id. at 594-95.
369. Id.
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certain that higher courts will agree with the Extreme Associates'
court's novel application of the Lawrence opinion. Given the Su-
preme Court's repeated reliance on the societal and parental in-
terests in rearing ethical and moral citizens, it would take an ex-
treme abandonment of the principles of stare decisis to read the
Lawrence case so expansively. Until the Court holds otherwise,
lower courts should find that rearing ethical and moral citizens
remains a constitutionally permissible state interest justifying
laws which restrict as to minors what would be constitutionally
protected rights as to adults.
The Court recognizes that minors are more susceptible to out-
side influences and less able to understand the full implications
of their behavior. This was most recently demonstrated in Roper
v. Simmons."' In Roper, the Court found that executing felons
who had been convicted of capital offenses committed while they
were sixteen or seventeen was cruel and unusual. 1 In reaching
that holding the Court found:
Three general differences between juveniles under 18 and adults
demonstrate that juvenile offenders cannot with reliability be classi-
fied among the worst offenders. First, as any parent knows and as
the scientific and sociological studies respondent and his amici cite
tend to confirm, "[a] lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of
responsibility are found in youth more often than in adults and are
more understandable among the young. These qualities often result
in impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions. . . ." It has
been noted that "adolescents are overrepresented statistically in vir-
tually every category of reckless behavior." . . . In recognition of the
comparative immaturity and irresponsibility of juveniles, almost
every State prohibits those under 18 years of age from voting, serv-
ing on juries, or marrying without parental consent....
The second area of difference is that juveniles are more vulnerable
or susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures, including
peer pressure.... This is explained in part by the prevailing circum-
stance that juveniles have less control, or less experience with con-
trol, over their own environment....
The third broad difference is that the character of a juvenile is not
as well formed as that of an adult. The personality traits of juveniles
are more transitory, less fixed.3 7 2
Because of these facts, the Court concluded: "Their own vulner-
ability and comparative lack of control over their immediate sur-
370. See 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005).
371. See id. at 1200.
372. Id. at 1195 (internal citations omitted).
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roundings mean juveniles have a greater claim than adults to be
forgiven for failing to escape negative influences in their whole
environment."37 3
If these findings justify restraint in imposing the ultimate pun-
ishment upon juvenile offenders, it certainly justifies protecting
minors from "negative influences and outside pressures" which
might motivate "reckless [and even criminal] behavior." If the
Constitution prohibits holding minors fully accountable for acts
that may have been motivated by such "negative influences," it
certainly must permit government to aid parents in preventing
them from ever being exposed to such influences in the first in-
stance, rather than facing the still dire consequences, for them-
selves and for their victims, of "failing to escape" them. The Court
cannot ignore its findings in Roper and pretend that graphically
violent video games are not a "negative influence." Indeed, its
findings in Roper compel the Court to take seriously the state's
compelling interest to protect minors from the various influences
which may motivate the very type of offenses which were the ba-
sis for the conviction of and death sentence given to the defendant
in Roper, the same type of offenses committed by the school
shooter at places like Bemdji, Minnesota, Columbine High School,
Bethel, Alaska, Paducah, Kentucky, and Jonesboro, Arkansas. To
argue otherwise is to compartmentalize scientific findings and
their legal import. Indeed, the public at large and parents in par-
ticular have the right to expect that the same Court which
showed mercy toward juvenile offenders in Roper will permit the
state to aid their efforts to rear children whose moral values dic-
tate against acts of violence in the first place.
Another finding in the Roper decision has relevance to the is-
sue of this article. The Court rejected the argument that jurors
could decide based on the specific juvenile involved whether he or
she had the maturity to resist "negative influences" and fully un-
derstand the implications of his or her violent criminal behav-
ior.374 In doing so, the Court noted the uncertainties of psycho-
logical diagnosis.37 The Court concluded that such uncertainties
should weigh in favor of protecting all minors from the death
penalty rather than allowing for individual application of that
373. Id. at 1186.
374. Id. at 1197.
375. Id.
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penalty based on jurors' findings of maturity based on the evi-
dence presented to them. 6 Any uncertainties which the Court
might have regarding the studies showing that minors are moti-
vated to violence by playing graphically violent video games
should, likewise, be resolved in favor of protecting minors from
such influences.
Applying the case law, scholarly comments, and the findings of
studies on the effect of graphically violent video games on minors,
the decisions in American Amusement Machine, Interactive Digi-
tal Software Association and Maleng that restrictions on minors'
access to such games violate the First Amendment must be called
into question. To the extent that those courts required a high de-
gree of scientifical certainty of harm, they simply misapplied the
Supreme Court's holdings in Ginsberg. To the extent those courts
held that government may only restrict minors' access to speech
that is obscene, they misapplied the Supreme Court's holding in
Pacifica. If Judge Posner was correct in holding that the basis for
restricting minors' access to non-obscene sexually explicit mate-
rial was offensiveness, then the Seventh Circuit's reasoning in
denying to extend that justification to graphically violent video
games is hard to understand. It is likely that if one were to take a
survey, more people would find the content of many graphically
violent video games more offensive than either the "girlie maga-
zines" which were the subject of Ginsberg or the seven filthy
words uttered by George Carlin in Pacifica. If the holdings in
those two cases are still good law, it is hard to imagine how any
court could find a compelling interest to restrict minors' access to
hearing any seven words, no matter how indecent, but not find
such an interest in restricting their access to media in which
they, as a player, brutally kick women in the groin until blood be-
gins to spurt out (Grand Theft Auto: Vice City),37 drive a crowbar
into the top of a man's head, resulting in a spray of gray matter
and blood (Manhunt),378 or decapitate a man by hitting the char-
acter's head with a baseball bat, resulting in a gush of blood from
the severed neck (Manhunt). If Carlin's seven filthy words "de-
base and brutalize humans," certainly games like Grand Theft
Auto: Vice City and Manhunt do. Indeed, the district court in
376. Id.
377. Take Two Interactive Software, Inc. 2002.
378. Take Two Interactive Software, Inc. 2003.
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American Amusement Machine reached the same conclusion, stat-
ing:
It would be an odd conception of the First Amendment and "vari-
able obscenity" that would allow a state to prevent a boy from pur-
chasing a magazine containing pictures of topless women in provoca-
tive poses, as in Ginsberg, but give that same boy a constitutional
right to train to become a sniper at the local arcade without his par-
ent's permission.
379
The courts which have struck down restrictions on minors' access
to graphically violent video games have clearly required more rig-
orous proof of actual harm and applied a higher standard than
that employed by the Supreme Court in Ginsberg and Pacifica.
When next given the opportunity, intellectual honesty requires
the Court to either extend its reasoning in Ginsberg and Pacifica
to graphically violent video games or to overrule those two cases.
Judge Posner appears to question if Ginsberg would be decided
the same way if it were before the Supreme Court today.38 ° If that
is the case, one must question why the Court has continued to as-
sert that protecting minors from non-obscene sexually explicit
material is a compelling state interest, as it did in Reno v.
ACLU 8 ' and United States v. American Library Association,
Inc.3" 2 If a majority of the Court rejects that proposition, those
justices should say so. The Court has an obligation to Congress
and to state and local decision makers not to lead them to believe
that it still finds such an interest compelling if in fact that is not
the case. The only conclusion one can draw is that the Court con-
tinues to find a compelling state interest in protecting minors
from such material. Not even one justice has stated otherwise de-
spite having had ample opportunity to do so over the past decade.
At the next opportunity, the Court should grant certiorari to con-
sider and extend its holdings in Ginsberg and Pacifica to content
more offensive, debasing and brutalizing than that which was the
subject of restrictions in those cases. It should reject any re-
quirement of greater evidence of scientific harm resulting from
379. Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 115 F. Supp. 2d 943, 981 (S.D. Ind.
2000).
380. See Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 579 (7th Cir. 2001).
381. 521 U.S. 844, 849 (1997) (acknowledging the "legitimacy and importance of the
congressional goal of protecting children from harmful materials").
382. 539 U.S. 194, 215 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("The interest in protecting
young library users from material inappropriate for minors is legitimate, and even compel-
ling, as all Members of the Court appear to agree.").
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interacting with such games than it required in Ginsberg. Alter-
natively, it should find that what scientific evidence does exist is
more compelling and certain than that which was available, but
not required, in Ginsberg.
VI. CONCLUSION
The issues addressed in this article are difficult. Our society
greatly values freedom of expression. We rightly understand that
freedom of expression is not merely a means to an end, but an
end in itself. Freedom of expression is an essential component of
freedom of thought and, as such, goes to the very heart of what it
means to be free. Thus, courts have been very reluctant to sanc-
tion any restriction on freedom of expression unless some actual,
concrete harm can be shown and then seldom permit prior re-
straint, but leave those who can prove actual harm to damages
resulting from the injurious expression. With the introduction of
many new media of expression, we have seen a history of efforts
to deny such expression First Amendment protection by denying
that the new media or the expression thereby conveyed are
speech. In each case, these efforts have ultimately proved unsuc-
cessful." 3 As demonstrated in this article, the genre of video
games which have been the subject of such efforts during the past
several years can be and have been very expressive and are as
worthy of protection as similar expressions in any other media.
Courts should reject all arguments which seek to deny video
games, as a class, the status of speech.
Yet our nation also has a long history of restricting minors ac-
cess to speech which is or may be harmful to them. This is par-
ticularly true of expression which contains sexually explicit mes-
sages: obscenity, child pornography and material harmful to
minors. The Court has also upheld restrictions aimed at inde-
cency. It has never required scientifically certain and measurable
harm, but has understood and affirmed that states have a com-
pelling interest in aiding parents in rearing their children to
value and respect the dignity of their fellow human beings. The
Court has wisely left it to parents to decide when their minor
children have reached the level of maturity necessary to receive
383. See supra note 7 (discussing the concerns raised with the introduction of a variety
of media or avenues of expression, including efforts to restrict access to some such media).
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access to certain sexually explicit material which is not obscene
as to adults and to indecency which debases and brutalizes the
dignity of others. By permitting restrictions on access, parents
can determine when and if their minor children will have access
to such material rather than leaving it to vendors who have no
legal responsibility to care for the ethical development of those
minors. Further, while recognizing that more mature minors may
have a greater ability to properly process the meaning of such ex-
pression and not be negatively influenced by it, parents, not ven-
dors, with a profit motive, nor courts, which can only apply a
broad and arbitrary standard of maturity, should decide when
their individual minor children have reached that stage.
The reasons which have led courts to find a compelling state
interest in restricting minors' access to non-obscene sexually ex-
plicit material and indecency apply at least as much, if not more,
to graphically violent video games. Courts should not require a
higher standard of certainty of harm from exposing minors to
such speech to justify restricting access than it has for sexually
explicit or indecent material. As with such material, if a graphi-
cally violent video game can be shown to have literary, scientific,
artistic or educational value as to minors then such restrictions
should not apply. Absent such a showing, however, parents, not
courts or commercial enterprises, should decide when an individ-
ual child is ready to interact with such material.
Parents, on the other hand, must recognize that any aid they
receive from the government to restrict their children's access to
such games is of limited value, if any, value unless they have a
comprehensive strategy for rearing children who, whether their
parents like it or not, will come of age in a world saturated with
information, much of which may make many parents uncomfort-
able. Attempts to completely prevent minor children from access-
ing graphically violent video games from birth to the age of ma-
jority are hopelessly naive, doomed to fail, and likely to be
counterproductive. Such games are here to stay. The primary
method of addressing this issue is for parents to rear their chil-
dren to find such displays of violence as offensive as they do and
to have a sophisticated understanding of the motives and mes-
sages intended by those who supply them with such content. All
government can do is provide some aid in giving parents more
control over when, not whether, their children will be exposed to
such material. Government can, consistent with the First
Amendment, and should provide that assistance.
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